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ELECTION SURVEILLANCE
Rebecca Green*

For most of this country's history, we have relied on
human eyes and ears to oversee our system of elections.
Modern surveillance tools, from cell phones to video
streaming platforms, are now cheap and ubiquitous.
Technology holds great promise to increase election
transparency. But the 2020 election confirmed what has
become quite clear: the use of technology to record election
processes does not always serve the goal of reassuring the
public of the integrity of elections; in fact, it can do the
opposite. As legislaturesaround the country reexamine rules
governing elections following the 2020 election, an
underexplored question is whether election surveillance
should be promoted or curbed. The line between democracyenhancing election transparency and civil liberty-trampling
This Article examines the
election surveillance is fuzzy.
history and present of election surveillance and reviews
legislationand litigationsurroundingit. The goal is to better
understandhow election surveillance can promote confidence
in election outcomes while dodging the dark sides of both
transparency and surveillance. As historic levels of public
mistrust of election outcomes threaten American democracy,
Election Surveillance examines these urgent questions.
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INTRODUCTION

On May 11, 2021, the City of Anchorage, Alaska held a runoff
election for mayor.1 Turnout was high. Election officials nobly rose
to the challenge of conducting the election under enormously strained
pandemic and political conditions. Echoing national leaders during
the 2020 election, one mayoral candidate called on supporters to
"heavily watch" the election process for fraud and irregularities. 2 A
deluge of the candidate's supporters descended. 3 Election officials
reported receiving ominous warnings: "There are a lot of eyes on you
individually. There are a lot of eyes on you as a group."4 A postelection memo from city election officials described the candidate's
supporters congregating in the Anchorage Election Center parking lot
taking photos of election officials entering and leaving and of license
plate numbers on election officials' cars.5 The candidate's supporters
also posted out-of-context photos and videos taken from inside the
election center on an online gossip column and discussed what they
saw on local talk radio, sowing disinformation and distrust about the
election process. 6 As it happened, their candidate won the election
and the tumult quickly subsided.7 But the experience left local

1. MUN. OF ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, NOTICE OF MAYORAL RUNOFF ELECTION,
NOTICE OF ANCHORAGE VOTE CENTERS (Apr. 25, 2021), https://www.muni.org/

departments/assembly/clerk/elections/documents/notices/1st%20notice%20of%2
Orunoff%20election.pdf.
2. Tim Elfrink, As GOP Candidate Used RV for 24/7 Watch, Anchorage
Election Staff Say They Faced 'UnprecedentedHarassment',WASH. POST (May 28,
2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/05/28/anchorage-electionharassment-bronson-dunbar/.
3. Id.
4. MUN. OF ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, ASSEMBLY MEMORANDUM No. AM 3412021, CERTIFICATION OF THE MAY 11, 2021 MAYORAL RUNOFF ELECTION 15 (May
25, 2021), https://www.muni.org/Departments/Assembly/Documents/AM%20341

-2021%20May%2011%2C%202021%20Mayoral%20Ruoff%20Election.pdf.

5. Id..
6. Id.
7. Elfrink, supra note 2.
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election officials and those who care about ensuring public confidence
in elections alarmed. 8
The impulse to watch elections firsthand is as old as American
democracy. Viva voce, or voice voting, routinely used in the late
eighteenth century, satisfied Americans' desire for verifiable voting
9
that they could see (and hear) for themselves. When the secret ballot
arrived in the late nineteenth century, state election designers
understood that nearly every other aspect of the process must be as
10
To
transparent as possible to ensure public faith in outcomes.
transparency
structural
on
relied
largely
states
this,
accomplish
regimes by which candidates and political parties appointed members
of the public to act as their eyes and ears during the election process
and report problems they saw to election officials." In modern
elections, election observers (sometimes referred to as "poll
watchers"), nonprofit groups, and members of the media monitor
elections. 12 State laws constrain election observation to ensure that
observers do not disrupt election processes, that problems are
reported in an orderly way, and that voters are able to cast ballots
free of intimidation or coercion.13
Rules in place for decades governing public oversight of elections
14
Advances in
face new challenges and urgently merit rethinking.
technology, like instantaneous transmission of photographic and
recorded content, place great stress on calibrations of old.15 Election
surveillance is now possible on a scope and scale never previously
imagined, is aimed at new targets, and has downstream effects not
fully considered. States are only just beginning to come to terms with
the power of our radically changed information environment, as well
as its potential benefits and enormous risks.
We think of mechanisms that allow members of the public to
observe voters and election officials during various points of the
election process as no-brainer, good government transparency: a

8. Id.
9. Indeed, Virginia and Kentucky employed viva voce voting through the
Civil War. James Schouler, Evolution of the American Voter, 2 AM. HIST. REV.
665, 671 (1897) ("[I]n the appeal to unflinching manliness at the polls these two
states insisted still that every voter should show at the hustings the courage of
his personal conviction.").
10. Rebecca Green, Rethinking Transparency in U.S. Elections, 75 OHIo ST.
L.J. 779, 789-90 (2014).
11. Id.
12. See discussion infra Part I.
13. See Policies for Election Observers, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES
(Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/policiesfor-election-observers.aspx#.
14. See generally Rebecca Green, Election Observation Post-2020, 90
FORDHAM L. REV. 467 (2021) (describing needed election reform).
15. Id. at 480-82 (describing how advances in technology can work to
undermine rather than promote transparency during elections).
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means to allow people to see for themselves that elections are fairly
run and that outcomes are correct. What better way to ensure public
buy-in than to let the sunlight pour in?16 Transparency, especially in
the election context, has long been understood as a democracyenhancing good. 17
But the use of recording technologies-like
photographing election workers' license plates in parking lots or
recording officials and voters entering and exiting election officesstrikes a worrisome chord. These tactics feel surveillance-like, with
all associated negative connotations. 18 With the continuing national
tumult following the 2020 election, questions surrounding the wisdom
of election surveillance are heating up. 19
When is election surveillance problematic and when is it
beneficial?
The line between democracy-enhancing election
transparency and civil liberty-trampling election surveillance is fuzzy
and underexplored. This Article examines the history and present of
election surveillance and reviews legislation and litigation
surrounding it. The goal is to better understand how election
surveillance can best promote confidence in election outcomes while
dodging the dark sides of both transparency and surveillance.
This Article proceeds in six parts.
Part I defines election
surveillance and determines its scope. Part II examines calls for
increased election surveillance following the 2020 election and
provides background for how these proposals differ from the status
quo. Part III unpacks transparency and surveillance, the relationship
between the two, and the risks and benefits of each in our current
information environment. Part IV provides a short history of election
surveillance tactics from Jim Crow to present. Part V reviews "right
to record" and election surveillance jurisprudence. Finally, Part VI
offers modest recommendations for regulating and reforming election
surveillance practices and discusses drawbacks of the proposals
offered.

16. Referring to Justice Louis Brandeis' famed observation. See Louis D.
Brandeis, Other People's Money, HARPER'S WKLY. (Dec. 20, 1913),
https://louisville.edu/law/library/special-collections/the-louis-d. -brandeiscollection/other-peoples-money-chapter-v ("Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.").
17. Green, supra note 14, at 494 ("This form of 'structured
transparency' ... is
a
central
component
of
modern-day
election
administration.").
18. See infra Part IV (discussing the long history of election surveillance as
a means of voter intimidation and discrimination).
19. See infra Part II; Eliza Sweren-Becker, Who Watches the Poll Watchers?,
BRENNAN

CTR.,

(April

29,

2021),

https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/

research-reports/who-watches-poll-watchers
following the 2020 election).

(detailing

proposed

legislation
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I. WHAT IS ELECTION SURVEILLANCE?
Election surveillance means different things to different people.
To some, election surveillance feels sinister and threatening; to
This Part
others, election surveillance is a civic imperative.
endeavors to parse a definition to provide a basis for analysis.
Sociologist and leading surveillance studies scholar David Lyon
20
Lyon describes surveillance as
provides a helpful starting point.
"focused, systematic[,] and routine attention .. . for purposes of
21
Two aspects of
influence, management, protection[,] or direction."
First, Lyon
purposes.
present
for
important
are
Lyon's definition
of people or places
observation
systematic
distinguishes
(surveillance) from casual observation. Surveillance is systematic,
22
Second, systematized
purposeful, and "structured" observation.
surveillance is undertaken in service of a specified goal. In Lyon's
framing, those goals generally involve influence, management,
23
In the election context, surveillance serves
protection, or direction.
several goals, including, but not limited to, ensuring the election is
conducted legally, identifying and deterring illegal activity, and
24
securing public confidence in election outcomes.
With this general definition in mind, election surveillance here
refers to the systematized recording of election processes using an
Borrowing from surveillance law, this
audio or video device.
25
definition excludes election observation using only the naked eye.
Election surveillance can be targeted at people (e.g., voters and
election officials) or at processes (e.g., absentee ballot processing, vote
20. Surveillance studies is a cross-disciplinary field of academic study that
examines modern surveillance tactics and processes their influence. Julie Cohen
has written thoughtfully about the overlap-and disconnect-between legal
scholarship and surveillance studies. See Julie Cohen, Studying Law Studying
Surveillance, 13 SURVEILLANCE & Soc'Y 91, 91 (2015) (defining the discipline of
surveillance studies).
21. DAvID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES: AN OvERVIEW 14 (2007).
22. Structured election transparency, as I have noted elsewhere, is an
In structured
attribute of election transparency in most U.S. states.
and
campaigns
by
appointed
individuals
on
rely
states
regimes,
transparency
political parties to observe in person. See Green, supranote 10 at 789-92.
23. LYON, supra note 21 and accompanying text.
24.

Election Security: State Policies, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES

(Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/electionsecurity-state-policies. aspx.
25. Here, this Article is borrowing the framework used in the federal
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, which regulates the use of electronic
technologies to intercept communications. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (defining
"intercept" as "the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire,
electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical,
Surveillance can be technologically sophisticated (spy
or other device").
satellites, microscopic microphones, and the like) or it can be accomplished with
everyday devices like a cell phone.

&
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tabulation, or voting equipment transport and storage). Depending
on state statutory configurations, election surveillance may be
conducted by election officials, by party or candidate-delegated
election observers, by members of the public, or by outside groups
seeking to monitor elections. 26 Election surveillance can take place
at any stage in the election process-before, during, and after Election
Day. 27 The term "election surveillance" also includes election officials'
use of electronic tools to monitor voters and election processes (termed
here "official election surveillance"). Examples of official election
surveillance include state-operated video cameras trained at absentee
ballot drop boxes or recount tables. 28
Data tracking of voters and voter registration databases are
beyond the scope of this Article. Numerous private organizations and
political parties engage in sophisticated data tracking (sometimes
referred to as "dataveillance") of voters and voter registration
databases to focus campaign efforts, curate candidate messaging,
influence political participation, and attempt to identify ineligible
voters. 29
The present effort focuses exclusively on electronic
surveillance of the administration of elections, understood as
processes associated with the casting and counting of ballots.36
26. See generally Green, supranote 14 (discussing, in part, who may conduct
election surveillance).
27.

How

Votes

Are

Counted,

CITIZENS

CLEAN

ELECTIONS

COMM'N,

https://www.azcleanelections.gov/election-security/how-votes-are-counted
(last
visited Mar. 17, 2022).
28. The Election Assistance Commission and the Cybersecurity
Infrastructure and Security Agency ("CISA") issued guidance for jurisdictions
installing drop boxes during the 2020 election to accommodate COVID-19
concerns. The recommendation included video surveillance for unstaffed twentyfour-hour drop boxes. See BALLOT DROP Box, CYBERSECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE
SEC. AGENCY 5, https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/electionofficials/vbm/
BallotDropBox.pdf; see also infra note 52 (showing examples of statutes
requiring official surveillance of drop boxes).
29. Margaret Hu, professor of law, has written on the impact of dataveillance
on voters. See Margaret Hu, Algorithmic Jim Crow, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 633,
683-84 (2017); Margaret Hu, Big DataBlacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735, 1745
(2016) ("Before individuals are allowed to fly, work, drive, or vote, citizens and
noncitizens alike may now be subjected to mass data collection and automated or
semi-automated database screening protocols."); see also Ira S. Rubinstein, Voter
Privacy in the Age of Big Data, 2014 Wis. L. REV. 861, 864 (2014) (discussing
implications for voter privacy stemming from modern political campaigns'
increasing reliance on the analysis of large data sets relating to voter consumer
habits and political activities).
30. This definition includes a wide variety of electronic devices and
technologies that may be used to surveil voting and election processes including
cell phones, video cameras, and other less obvious technologies like GPS tracking.
See, e.g., Stephen Fowler, GBI Says GOP's Cellphone Data Lacks Enough
Evidence to Prove Ballot Harvesting, GA. PUB. BROAD. NEWS (Oct. 22, 2021, 4:01
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The present discussion also does not engage whether, and the
extent to which, state statutes should allow members of the media to
cover elections-although media access raises a valuable set of
31
Some state statutes contain
questions that lurk on the periphery.
the press to cover election
of
members
enabling
provisions
specific
32
specified circumstances.
under
and
periods
processes for limited
2

PM), https://www.gpb.org/news/20 1/10/22/gbi-says-gops-cellphone-data-lacksenough-evidence-prove-ballot-harvesting (describing unsuccessful allegations of
voter fraud based on cell phone tracking data near absentee ballot drop boxes in
Georgia).
31. Attorney Leena Ketkar offers an argument for greater press access at the
polls. See Leena Ketkar, Do DemocraciesDie Behind the Doors of PollingPlaces:
Finding a First Amendment Right of Press Access to Polling Places for
Newsgathering, 76 U. PIrr. L. REV. 593, 600-11 (2015).
32. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-236(c) (2021) ("Representatives of the
news media shall be allowed to enter, remain within and leave any polling place
or restricted area surrounding any polling place to observe the election, provided
any such representative who in any way interferes with the orderly process of
voting shall be evicted by the moderator."); IND. CODE § 3-6-10-1 (2021) (allowing
media organizations to appoint one watcher for each precinct but remaining
silent on whether or not the media-appointed watcher may use recording
equipment); IOWA CODE § 49.104 (2021) ("Reporters, photographers, and other
staff representing the news media [may be present at polling places]. However,
representatives of the news media, while present at or in the immediate vicinity
of the polling places, shall not interfere with the election process in any way.");
MD. CODE REGs. 33.07.04.02 (2022) (prohibiting cameras in polling places but
making an exception for members of the media: "Cameras [may be] used by media
representatives as long as the media representatives are recording polling place
operations and not a screen or ballot"); MINN. STAT. § 204C.06.8 (2021) (providing
for media access at polling places: "A news media representative may enter a
polling place during voting hours only to observe the voting process. A media
representative must present photo identification to the head election judge upon
arrival at the polling place, along with either a recognized media credential or
written statement from a local election official attesting to the media
representative's credentials"); OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 7-112 (2021) ("[A] news
reporter or photographer may, in the course of covering the election being
conducted, be allowed inside the election enclosure for a period not to exceed five
(5) minutes."); VA. CODE § 24.2-604.5(B) (2020) ("The officers of election shall
permit representatives of the news media to visit and film or photograph inside
the polling place for a reasonable and limited period of time while the polls are
open. However, the media (i) shall [not interfere with voting processes]; (ii) shall
not film or photograph any person who specifically asks the media representative
at that time that he not be filmed or photographed; (iii) shall not film or
photograph the voter or the ballot in such a way that divulges how any individual
voter is voting; and (iv) shall not film or photograph the voter list or any other
voter record or material at the precinct in such a way that it divulges the name
or other information concerning any individual voter. Any interviews with
voters, candidates, or other persons; live broadcasts; or taping of reporters'
remarks shall be conducted outside of the polling place and the prohibited area.
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Most state election codes are silent on whether members of the media
are permitted to observe and/or record election processes. 33
Finally, election surveillance, as used here, also excludes ballot
selfies-a phenomenon that first came to courts' attention in 2014.34
Plaintiffs in states around the country challenged state laws
prohibiting individual voters from photographing their own ballot on
First Amendment grounds. 35
In some states, ballot selfies
contravened statutes prohibiting photography in polling places. But
the core concern (and the reasons why many state legislatures like
New Hampshire's moved to ban the practice) involved ballot secrecy
laws in place to prevent vote buying schemes.3 6 For purposes of the
present effort, election surveillance tactics considered here do not
engage the ballot secrecy status quo. Individuals, organizations, and
legislators pushing for increased election surveillance do not argue
against ballot secrecy or advocate for the right to record the content
of one's own ballot. 37 That said, as the discussion below reveals, ballot
selfie litigation is informative since it forced courts-and
legislatures-to think through the use of technology in polling places
and the consequences of American voters' right to record during
elections.

The officers of election may require any person who is found by a majority of the
officers present to be in violation of this subsection to leave the polling place and
the prohibited area.").
33. Media questions are excluded in part because when the traditional press
chooses to cover an event (an election, a town hall meeting, or a movie premiere,
for example), press activity is not generally understood as surveillance (with the
possible exception of some paparazzi tactics aimed at celebrities). Certainly, the
British Royal Family attests to this problem. See, e.g., Tara John, Prince George
is Being Hounded by Paparazzi, Complains William and Kate, TIME (Aug. 14,
2015, 7:30 AM), https://time.com/3997827/prince-george-paparazzi/ (describing
efforts by the Royal Family to stop increasingly aggressive paparazzi surveillance
tactics). In addition, it should be noted that as lines blur between citizen
journalists and the traditional press, media coverage and election surveillance as
understood here start to blend together. See Adam Cohen, The Media that Need
Citizens: The First Amendment and the Fifth Estate, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 13
(2011) (discussing the role of citizen journalists); Gary A. Hengstler, Sheppard v.
Maxwell Revisited-Do the Traditional Rules Work for NontraditionalMedia?,
71 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 172-73 (2008) (describing blurred lines between
traditional and nontraditional media).
34. For a general overview of state responses to ballot selfies, see Secrecy of
the Ballot and Ballot Selfies, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (June 24, 2021),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/secrecy-of-the-ballotand-ballot-selfies.aspx.
35. See infra Part V.
36. See Rideout v. Gardner, 838 F.3d 65, 74 (1st Cir. 2016) (striking ballot
selfie prohibition but acknowledging the state's interest in preventing vote
buying and voter coercion made "easier by providing proof of how the voter
actually voted").
37. See infra Part V.
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With this definition and scope of election surveillance in mind,
Part II turns to an overview of post-2020 election surveillance
legislative proposals and how they differ from the status quo.
II. THE PUSH FOR ELECTION SURVEILLANCE POST-2020

That elections should be transparent is a given. The more the
public can verify that elections were administered fairly and
according to state and federal law, the better. In the lead up to the
2020 election, this impulse propelled heated calls for "armies" of
observers to ferret out fraud at the polls and attendant concerns about
whether such tactics would lead to voter intimidation or even
violence. 38 Following the 2020 election, legislators around the
country have weighed increased election surveillance. The Illinois
General Assembly, for example, considered a law requiring that all
39
The Texas Legislature
election observers wear body cameras.
considered a bill to empower poll watchers to take photos or videos of
40
suspected ineligible voters at polling places to send to the state. The
bill proposed that "[a] watcher may electronically transmit a photo,
video, or audio recording made by the watcher during the watcher's
service directly to the Secretary of State if the watcher reasonably
believes the photo, video, or recording contains evidence of unlawful
activity." 41
Criticism of the proposed law followed, noting the long history in
42
Texas of poll watchers harassing and intimidating minority voters.
38. Trevor Hughes, Trump Army' of Poll Watchers Could Frighten Voters,
14, 2020, 5:17 PM),
Incite Violence, Election Officials Warn, USA TODAY (Oct.
4 2
2
https://www.usatoday.comstory/news/politics/elections/20 0/10/1 / 020See the
election-trump-army-poll-watchers-stirs-fears-violence/5908264002/.
surveillance.
election
of
history
the
addressing
IV,
discussion infra Part
Importantly, such concerns did not appear to materialize, likely in part because
COVID-19 complicated in-person voter intimidation efforts. Some suggest
another reason: that voter intimidation tactics may be moving online. See
Michael Weingartner, Remedying Intimidating Voter Disinformation Through §
1985(3)'s Support-or-Advocacy Clauses, 110 GEo. L.J. ONLINE 83, 86 (2021),
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/georgetown-law-journal/glj-online/glj-onlinevol-110/remedying-intimidating-voter-disinformation-through-19853s-supportor-advocacy-clauses/ ("A more troubling explanation [why in-person voter
intimidation did not emerge on a wide scale in 2020] is that voter intimidation
simply moved from the polling place to cyberspace. Indeed, while things were
quiet at the polls in 2020, social media and other electronic channels were awash
with disinformation designed to intimidate voters and keep them from the
polls.").
39. H.B. 3553, 102d Gen. Assemb., 2021 Legis. Sess. (Ill. 2021).
40. S.B. 7, 87th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2021).
41. Id.
42. Paul Stinson, Texas Elections Bill Would Allow Video Surveillance at
Polls, BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 12, 2021, 6:01 AM), https:/news.bloomberglaw.com/
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Said one critic, "'[g]iving untrained poll watchers the authority to take
matters into their own hands and record Texans who are simply
trying to exercise their right to vote is a recipe for disaster."'43
Countered the legislator who drafted the bill in its defense, "'I would
think we would want video to help sort out what really happened so
it wouldn't be a swearing match."' 44
Similarly moved by the promise of surveillance to address
concerns about illegal voting, the New Hampshire legislature passed
a law requiring voters who register on Election Day but lack an
accepted photo ID to have their photos taken by election officials at
the polling place.4 5 Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, and Virginia all also
considered bills that would require video recording of election
proceedings at various stages. 46
At present, most state statutes are either silent on election
surveillance or prohibit certain actors from engaging in election
surveillance in limited circumstances.47 Virginia law, for example,
bars election observers from recording inside polling places.4 8
Georgians may not use cell phones, take photos, or record videos of
voting. 49
Colorado law prohibits election surveillance broadly,
banning the use of "any electronic device to take or record pictures,
video, or audio in any polling location or other place election activities
are conducted." 50 Some prohibitions on election surveillance appear
privacy-and-data-security/texas-elections-bill-would-allow-video-surveillance-atpolls.
43. Id.
44. Id. (quoting Senate State Affairs Committee Chairman Bryan Hughes
(R), who authored the bill).
45. H.B. 523, 2021 Session (N.H. 2021).
46. H.B. 537, 156th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2021); H.B. 3553, 102d
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2021); S.F. 1515, 92d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2021);
and H.B. 1746, 2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2021).
47. Only twelve states explicitly prohibit recording in their election code:
Arizona, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-515(G) (2021); California, CAL. ELEc. CODE §
18541(a)(3) (West 2021); Colorado, COLO. CODE REGS. § 1505-1:8 (2021) (Rule
8.14.7); the District of Columbia, D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 3, § 706.17(f) (2020);
Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-408(d) (2021); Maryland, MD. CODE REGS.
33.07.04.02 (2022); Mississippi, Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-577(4)(c) (2021);
Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-104(e) (2021); Texas, TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §
33.051(c) (West 2021); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-3a-801(5)(a)(i) (LexisNexis
2021); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-604.4(D) (2021); and West Virginia (W. VA.
CODE § 3-4A-23 (2021).
48. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-604.4(D) (2021) ("Authorized representatives shall
be allowed, whether in a regular polling place or central absentee voter precinct,
to use a handheld wireless communications device but shall not be allowed to use
such a device to capture a digital image inside the polling place or central
absentee voter precinct."). But see VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-604.5(B) (2021) (allowing
media coverage for a limited period of time).
49. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-408(d) (2021).
50. COLO. CODE REGS. § 1505-1:8 (2021) (Rule 8.14.7).
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For example, a California voter
in voter intimidation laws.
intimidation statute warns that "no person shall photograph, video
5
record, or otherwise record a voter." I
Numerous state statutes affirmatively require official election
52
surveillance of various election processes. Arizona law, for example,
requires that a recording be made of the chain of ballot custody that
must be kept as a public record for at least as long as the challenge

51. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 18541(a)(3) (West 2021) (stipulating that this
prohibition applies within one hundred yards of a polling place). In some states,
prohibitions on recording do not appear in statutory or regulatory text but are

found in guidance from chief election officials. For example, the Michigan
Secretary of State's website advises that election observers may not "use a video
camera or recording device, or the camera or recording features of a smart phone
or tablet in [a] polling place or clerk's office." THE APPOINTMENT, RIGHTS AND
DUTIES OF ELECTION CHALLENGERS AND POLL WATCHERS, MICH. DEP'T OF STATE
BUREAU OF ELECTIONS (2020), https://www.michigan.gov/documents/SOSED_

2_CHALLENGERS_77017_7.pdf. Other examples of states discouraging election
surveillance via secretary of state guidance include Minnesota and Montana.
Polling Place Rules, OFF.

OF THE MINN.

SEC'Y

OF STATE

STEVE

SIMON

https://www.sos.state.mn.us/elections-voting/election-day-voting/polling-placerules/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2022); MONT. SEC'Y OF STATE: ELECTIONS & VOTER
SERVS.

DIV.,

MONTANA ELECTION JUDGE HANDBOOK 2020, at 11 (2020).

Numerous state statutes require official election surveillance. See, e.g.,
§ 34-1007(2) (2021) ("If the absentee ballots are opened prior to
election day, the ballots shall be securely maintained in a nonproprietary
electronic access-controlled room under twenty-four (24) hour nonproprietary
video surveillance that is livestreamed to the public and which video must be
archived for at least ninety (90) days following the election."); IOWA CODE §
53.17(4) (2021) ("A video surveillance system shall be used to monitor all activity
at the ballot drop box at all times while the ballot drop box is in place. The system
shall create a recording, which shall be reviewed by the state commissioner,
county attorney, and law enforcement in the event that misconduct occurs."); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 117.086(c)(3) (West 2021) ("Any drop-box or receptacle located
outside of the county clerk's office shall be . . . [u]nder video surveillance at all
times . . . ."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:63-16.1(2)(a) (West 2021) ("A ballot drop box
shall mean a secured drop box that is not required to be within view of a live
person for monitoring. All ballot drop boxes shall be available for use by a voter
[twenty-four] hours a day and shall be placed at locations equipped with security
cameras that allow for surveillance of the ballot drop box."); OR. REV. STAT. §
254.074(1)(b)(H) (2021) ("A county elections security plan shall include, but is not
limited to[,] . . . [t]he number and location of all video surveillance cameras
within the elections office .... "); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2543a(d)(2) (2021)
("Drop boxes shall be installed and maintained in accordance with guidance
issued by the [s]ecretary of [s]tate's office. At a minimum, drop boxes shall . .. be
under [twenty-four] hour video surveillance or in the alternative be within sight
of the municipal building."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-6-9(E)(3) (2021) ("[A]ll secured
containers shall be monitored by video surveillance cameras and the video
recorded by that system shall be retained by the county clerk as a record related
to voting pursuant to the provisions of Section 1-12-69 NMSA 1978.").
52.
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period for the general election. 53 Given strained pandemic and
political conditions in 2020, some states required live video streams
of election processes to allow the public to observe remotely. 54
This brief review reveals that state election surveillance statutes
are scattershot. These statutory vagaries are colliding head on with
a crisis in confidence in elections. Despite the heroics of election
administrators around the country to administer elections fairly and
transparently amidst a pandemic in 2020,55 and even though dozens
of courts around the country rejected claims of malfeasance and
fraud,5 6 a steady drumbeat undermining the 2020 election outcome
has convinced millions of Americans to distrust election
administration in this country. 57 Far from dodging a bullet in 2020,

53. Arizona's statute mandates that the live video be made available on the
Secretary of State's website for viewing by the public. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16621(D) (2021) ("For any statewide, county[,] or legislative election, the county
recorder or officer in charge of elections shall provide for a live video recording of
the custody of all ballots while the ballots are present in a tabulation room in the
counting center. The live video recording shall include date and time indicators
and shall be linked to the secretary of state's website. The [S]ecretary of [S]tate
shall post links to the video coverage for viewing by the public.")
54. Governor Hutchinson of Arkansas issued an executive order in advance
of the 2020 election as follows:
WHEREAS: In addition to in-person examination of the canvassing
process by candidates and poll watchers, I encourage county election
officials to livestream the processing, canvassing, and counting of outer
and inner envelopes online to the extent possible to provide additional
transparency and otherwise mitigate unnecessary exposure to COVID19 for individuals who may choose to observe remotely ....
Ark. Exec. Order No. 20-44 (Aug. 7, 2020), https://governor.arkansas.gov/
images/uploads/executiveOrders/EO_20-44.pdf.
55. Nathaniel Persily & Charles Stewart III, The Miracle and Tragedy of the
2020
U.S.
Election,
32
J.
DEMOCRACY
159,
159
(2021),
https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-miracle-and-tragedy-of-the2020-u-s-election/ ("The 2020 U.S. election was ... a miracle in that election
administrators, facing unprecedented challenges from a pandemic, were able to
pull off a safe, secure, and professional election in which a record number of
Americans turned out to vote.").
56. Fact Check: Courts Have Dismissed Multiple Lawsuits of Alleged
Electoral FraudPresented by Trump Campaign, REUTERS (Feb. 15, 2021, 10:41
AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-factcheck-courts-election/fact-checkcourts-have-dismissed-multiple-lawsuits-of-alleged-electoral-fraud-presentedby-trump-campaign-idUSKBN2AF1G1 (noting that U.S. courts "dismissed more
than [fifty] lawsuits of alleged electoral fraud and irregularities presented by
Trump and allies").
57. Domenico Montanaro, Most Americans Trust Election Are Fair, But
Sharp Divides Exist, a New Poll Finds, NPR (Nov. 1, 2021, 5:01 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2021/11/01/1050291610/most-americans-trust-electionsare-fair-but-sharp-divides-exist-a-new-poll-finds (noting that only "[fifty-eight
percent] [of respondents] said they trust elections").
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the U.S. system of elections took a direct hit: a significant portion of
58
the U.S. electorate doubts the 2020 outcome to this day.
In this uncertain environment, an understandable temptation is
to subject elections to far greater surveillance. Surveillance has long
59
Yet we are
been used as a mechanism to reduce perceived risk.
transparency
that
better,
always
not
is
watching
learning that more
has its downsides, and that modern information architectures enable
distorting effects that can undermine democratic functioning. With
this in mind, the next Part examines transparency and surveillance
theory as a backdrop for evaluating the benefits and risks of election
surveillance.
III. TRANSPARENCY & SURVEILLANCE

As modern recording and communications technologies
proliferate, both transparency and surveillance have experienced
revolutionary change. Courts and policymakers have struggled with
the implications of exploding capability and scale in both the
60
The following Subparts
transparency and surveillance contexts.
examine challenges that have surfaced in both realms.

58. Press Release, Ipsos, Reuters/Ipsos: Trump's Coattails (Apr. 2, 2021),

2
https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/ 021-

04/toplinewriteupreuters_ipsos_trump_coattailspoll_-_april_02_2021.pdf
(finding that six months after the November 2020 election, fifty-five percent of
Republicans believe former President Trump's 2020 election loss resulted from
illegal voting or election rigging).
59. See DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANcE SOCIETY: MONITORING EVERYDAY LIFE 6
(2001) ("Surveillance is the means whereby knowledge is produced for
administering populations in relation to risk.").
60. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415-16 (2012) (Sotomayor,
J., concurring) ("GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a
person's public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial,
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations. The government can
store such records and efficiently mine them for information years into the future.
And because GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance
techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks
that constrain abusive law enforcement practices: 'limited police resources and
community hostility."' (quoting Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004))); U.S.
Dep't of Just. v. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 764 (1989)
(noting that in the Freedom of Information Act case, the difference between paper
and electronic files is that "[p]lainly there is a vast difference between the public
records that might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county
archives, and local police stations throughout the country and a computerized
summary located in a single clearinghouse of information").
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Transparency Transgressions

"Transparency" is widely understood as a bedrock democratic
principle.61 It is a device by which the weak can influence the
powerful-the essence of democracy.62 Political theorists have long
counseled that a citizenry must be adequately informed about
government actors and institutions to hold elected officials
accountable at the voting booth.6 3 The goal of transparency in a
liberal democracy is to compel the "state to give an account of itself to
its public and to justify its actions." 64 While long viewed as an
unmitigated good, scholars are beginning to document the downsides
of transparency in modern information environments.
In 2009, Harvard Law Professor Lawrence Lessig published an
influential article, Against Transparency,challenging the notion that
transparency is an inalienable good. 65 Professor Lessig noted that the
"radical decline in the cost of collecting, storing, and distributing
data," 66 at least in theory, promised a new age of civic enlightenment.
Despite this promise, Professor Lessig worried that "naked
transparency" would lead to distortions.67 Releases of information out
of context, he cautioned, could "push any faith in our political system
over the cliff."68
People exposed to a fire hose of government
information might ignore, misunderstand; or misuse it to their-and
democracy's-detriment.69 Responding to Justice Brandeis's famous
quip, Lessig concluded that, "[s]unlight may well be a great

61. Maria Smith, Biden Must Act to Ensure Government Transparency,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Feb. 8, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/analysis-opinion/biden-must-act-ensure-government-transparency

(suggesting that "transparency" is a "bedrock value[] of our democracy").
62. Nikki Sutton, President Obama on Open Government: "The Essence of
Democracy", WHITE
HOUSE:
BLOG
(Sept.
20,
2011,
6:23
PM),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/09/20/president-obama-opengovernment-essence-democracy.
63. James Madison famously cautioned that "[a] popular Government,
without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a
Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both." Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry
(Aug. 4, 1822), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-02-02-0480.
64. Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IowA L. REV. 885, 897
(2006).
65. Lawrence Lessig, Against Transparency, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 9, 2009),
https://newrepublic.com/article/70097/against-transparency.
66. Id.
67. See Id. (analyzing the risks of the "naked transparency movement").
68. Id.
69.

Id.

(quoting ARCHON FUNG ET. AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND

PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 53 (2007)) ("Whether and how new information is
used to further public objectives depends upon its incorporation into complex
chains of comprehension, action, and response.").
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disinfectant. But as anyone who has ever waded through a swamp
70
knows, it has other effects as well."
Ten years after Professor Lessig's observations, when the harsh
sociopolitical realities of our distorted information environment had
become even more apparent, legal scholar Stanley Fish went
further. 71 Fish identified transparency not just as a potential peril
but as a modern evil. Fish centered his critique of transparency on
the First Amendment credo that more speech is invariably better: the
Supreme Court-sanctified idea that the best antidote to problematic
72
Fish argued that in our current internetspeech is counterspeech.
"unimpeded circulation of
environment,
information
addled
the First Amendment's
tramples
information"
of
amounts
unbounded
73
Edenic "more speech"
that
warned
Fish
theology.
"more speech"
actors (foreign and
nefarious
because
part
in
crumbled
have
visions
for bad ends.
mechanisms
transparency
manipulate
to
seek
domestic)
As Fish describes,
predators

and

trolls ...

take

advantage

both

of

the

indiscriminate and undifferentiated nature of what is offered

and of its anonymity, for in those features of the digital
experience they will find the materials with which they can

fashion malevolent messages, secure in the knowledge that the
them are
gatekeeping norms that might expose and stop 74
discredited.
been
have
they
nowhere in sight because

The implications of naked transparency, or what Fish termed
75
in modern elections is concerning.
"unbounded information,"
Elections are complex, decentralized, administrative events that
unfold in multiple stages and are governed by detailed federal, state,
76
Built into the
and local law, as well as regulation and practice.
70. Id. (citing Brandeis, supra note 16).
71. For the full chapter containing Fish's observations discussed below, see

generally STANLEY FISH, THE FIRST: HoW TO THINK ABOUT HATE SPEECH, CAMPUS
SPEECH, RELIGIOUS SPEECH, FAKE NEWS, POST-TRUTH, AND DONALD TRUMP (2019).

72. The "more speech" credo is perhaps most famously articulated by Justice
Brandeis: "If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and
fallacies .. . the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence."
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
73. FISH, supra note 71, at 153. Fish drew on the work of Mark Fenster for
the idea that government transparency is now obscured by way of deluge. As
Fenster described, "[T]he excess of available information limits the ability to
know and understand any part of the state and its operations." MARK FENSTER,
THE TRANSPARENCY Fix: SECRETS, LEAKS, AND UNCONTROLLABLE GOvERNMENT
INFORMATION 129 (2017).

74. FIsH, supra note 71, at 164-65.
75. FISH, supra note 71, at 162.
76. See generally Election Administration at State and Local Levels, NAT'L
CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/
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election process in every state are multiple layers of safeguards to
prevent fraud and ensure fairness and ballot security-processes that
to the untrained eye might seem inexplicable at best and criminal at
worst. Those observing election processes often cannot understand
what they see without training and-critically-context.
To make matters worse, nefarious actors seeking to manipulate
information about elections have new tools enabling distortion and
manipulation of audio and video images with a degree of realism
never before possible. 77 The specter of deep fakes and other
technologically sophisticated manipulations of election "evidence"
adds to long-lived, low-tech manipulative editing. 78 Amped up
manipulation capabilities constitute a dangerous threat to elections
we are already seeing play out.
Examples of these currents in the 2020 election are many. Ballot
duplication is illustrative. Ballot duplication is a process election
officials undertake when, for a variety of reasons, a voter's original
ballot is spoiled or damaged. 79 Ballots can be spoiled for a variety of
reasons from coffee spills to being filled out with an implement that
the vote scanner cannot recognize (think highlighter, eyeliner, or
crayon).o In these instances, where the intent of the voter is clear
but the vote tabulation system will not count the ballot unless election
officials take action, state laws provide for strict and multilayered
procedures that allow teams of election officials to duplicate ballots so
that they will pass through voting tabulation equipment and be

elections-and-campaigns/election-administration-at-state-and-local-levels. aspx
(explaining the "highly decentralized election administration system" in the
United States).
77. See Richard L. Hasen, Deep Fakes, Bots, and Siloed Justices:American
Election Law in a "Post-Truth"World, 64 ST. Louis U. L.J. 535, 542-43 (2020)
(including a hypothetical about how deep fakes could falsify a politician's
statements); Rebecca Green, Counterfeit Campaign Speech, 70 HASTINGS L.J.
1445, 1451 n.30 (2019) (including a hypothetical about how deep fakes could place
a politician next to a controversial figure). See generally Bobby Chesney
Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and
National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1753 (2019) (discussing the basics of deep
fakes, their impacts on society, and solutions to the issues they present).
Professors Chesney and Citron broadly define "deep fakes" as "[t]echnologies for
altering images, video, or audio (or even creating them from scratch) in ways that
are [highly realistic] and difficult to detect." Chesney & Citron, supra note 77, at
1757.
78. See, e.g., Green, supra, note 77, at 1452 n.31 (discussing footage of Nancy
Pelosi that was edited to make it seem as though she was drunk).
79. Michelle Shafer, Ballot Duplication: What It Is, What It Is Not, and Why
We Are Talking About It in 2020, THE COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS (July 20, 2020),
https:/ovi. csg.org/ballot-duplication-what-it-is-what-it-is-not-and-why-we-aretalking-about-it-in-2020/.
80. Id.
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counted. 81 A new ballot is created and the damaged ballot is typically
82
retained for auditing purposes.
To the untrained eye, ballot duplication might appear as if
election officials are huddled in dark corners filling out blank ballots
at whim. In reality, however, ballot duplication is a ho-hum, carefully
regulated practice election officials undertake in every election.
Nevertheless, in Philadelphia, an official livestream of election
83
officials duplicating damaged ballots backfired wildly. The feed was
taken out of context and used to spread the lie that election officials
84
were committing fraud.
Other examples in 2020 abound. A video in Fulton County,
Georgia, showed a worker crumpling up an instruction sheet in
frustration. 85 The video made it appear as if he was destroying a
Death threats ensued, forcing the election worker into
ballot.
86
In another example from Fulton County, conspiracists
hiding.
footage spreading a lie that an election worker had
video
circulated
hidden a "suitcase" of ballots from observers and then scanned them
without supervision. 87 The election worker (and her daughter) were
subject to repeated threats and harassment, including death
threats. 88 In another example, a photograph of an election worker
turned into a scandal as some alleged that the Pennsylvania state
89
One
election worker was in fact a state senator from Georgia.
Facebook user wrote as a caption to the posted picture, "State Senator
81. Michelle Shafer, Ballot DuplicationTechnology: What It Is and How Does
It Work?, COUNCIL STATE Gov'Ts (Aug. 31, 2020), https://ovi.csg.org/ballotduplication-technology-what-is-it-and-how-does-it-work/.
82. Id.
83. McKenzie Sadeghi, Fact Check: Viral Video Shows Pennsylvania Poll
Workers Fixing Damaged Ballots, USA TODAY (Nov. 6, 2020, 4:25 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/factcheck/2020/11/06/fact-check-video89
002/.
shows-pennsylvania-poll-workers-fixing-damaged-ballots/61855
84. Id.
85. Kate Brumback & Jude Joffe-Block, GeorgiaPoll Worker in HidingAfter
False Claims Online, AP NEWS (Nov. 6, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/fact2
check-georgia-poll-worker-in-hiding-aa0f256ec 1de96fd5a41da703c4b443.
86. Id.
87. Susan McCord, Georgia Officials Debunk 'Secret Ballot Suitcase' Claim;
To Re-certify Results for Biden, AUGUSTA CHRON. (Dec. 7, 2020, 12:29 PM),
2
https://www.augustachronicle.com/story/news/politics/elections/presidential/ 02
0/ 12/07/secret-suitcase-magic-ballots-actually-bag-ballots-packed/3858322001/
(explaining the source of the confusion of the "suitcase of ballots" conspiracy
theory).
88. See id.; see also Reid J. Epstein, Two Election Workers Targeted by ProTrump Media Sue for Defamation, N.Y. TIMEs (Dec. 2, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/02/us/politics/gateway-pundit-defamationlawsuit.html.
89. Arijeta Lajka, Photo Shows Poll Worker in Pennsylvania, Not Georgia
Senator, AP NEWS (Dec. 8, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/fact-checking9855850817.
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Elena Parent of Georgia is seen here counting ballots in Pa? Not sure
that's lawful Senator ... ."90
The Georgia state senator tried to
clarify that she had neither been to Pennsylvania in 2020 nor counted
any ballots, but the damage had been done. 91
As these examples demonstrate, the dangers of unbounded
election transparency can fuel the fires of mis- and disinformation,
bringing the perils of election surveillance into greater relief.
B.

The Transparencyand Surveillance Overlay

Concerns about transparency collide with modern surveillance
techniques that transform the means by which those seeking
transparency can secure it. Surveillance and transparency have a
complex and poorly understood relationship. 92 This Subpart points to
three aspects of the transparency/surveillance overlay that can shed
light on election surveillance questions: (1) the care and control
dichotomy; (2) the distinction between covert versus overt
surveillance; and (3) the impacts of who does the watching.
1.

Care and Control

Unlike transparency, surveillance gets a bad rap. From a public
perception standpoint, surveillance is commonly equated with the
powerful
manipulating or controlling the less powerful. 93
Surveillance
invokes
Orwell's
"Big
Brother," 94 Foucault's
95
panopticon, and harmful, oppressive incursions into precious civil
liberties. Surveillance is the all-seeing totalitarian state or the
voracious company tracking our every move. Too much surveillance
and we risk, as Justice Brennan cautioned in 1963, becoming

90. Id. Twitter also picked up on the action with one caption reading, "Elena
Parent, Democratic Senator, why are you opening ballots and in counting rooms?
I didn't know a [senator's] job description was to work in election counting
rooms?" Id.
91. Id. ('"The allegations are false. I am not depicted in the video or stills,'
Parent explained. 'I have not been to Pennsylvania anytime in 2020 and I have
never coynted ballots in a state or local election."').
92. In some ways, the two concepts are like apples and oranges. As Frederick
Schauer points out, we think of "transparency [as] an attribute rather than an
activity (like speaking or writing)"-or, presumably, surveillance. Frederick
Schauer, Transparencyin Three Dimensions, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1339, 1343-44
(2011) (emphasis added).

93. LYON, supranote 21, at 20, 32.
94.
95.

See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 3, 34-45 (1949).
See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON

200-01, 203, 208 (Alan Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 1977) (1975).
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96
Surveillance, at least in the popular
"hagridden and furtive."
threatening.
democracy
decidedly
is
conscience,
with surveillance that serves
replete
is
society
modern
And yet,
to sophisticated law
nurseries
in
monitors
baby
the public good-from
and prevent
detect
that
technologies
surveillance
enforcement
97
to manage
societies
and
individuals
enables
Surveillance
crime.
98
This
behavior.
law-abiding
encourage
and
risk, improve safety,
the
out,
points
Lyon
David
As
itself.
term
the
in
captured
duality is
which
surveiller,
verb
French
the
from
derives
word surveillance
means to "watch over." 99 The act of watching over something or
someone can be viewed as providing a social good. One might ask
someone to "watch over" their child for purposes of ensuring the
child's safety. Then again, one might also request that a naughty
child be "watched over" as a disciplinary effort to punish a little
miscreant. At least from the child's perspective, this latter version
has a decidedly negative bent. Lyon identifies this "care and control"
100
duality of surveillance.
The care and control duality is helpful in understanding
divergent views on election surveillance. In one frame, election
surveillance is a form of "caring" for the integrity of an election and

96. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 470 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("If electronic surveillance by government becomes sufficiently widespread, and
there is little in prospect for checking it, the hazard that as a people we may
become hagridden and furtive is not fantasy.").
97. See, e.g., Kami Chavis Simmons, Body-Mounted Police Cameras: A
Primer on Police Accountability vs. Privacy, 58 How. L.J. 881, 884-89 (2015)
(describing the benefits and shortcomings of police body cameras).
98. See LYON, supra note 21, at 6. Numerous scholars have written about
the many benefits of surveillance. See Chaz Arnett, From Decarcerationto Ecarceration, 41 CARDozo L. REV. 641, 699-701 (2019) (discussing the literature
supporting benefits of "ecarceration," a term referencing correctional surveillance
technology tools in the criminal justice system, such as electronic ankle
monitors); Henry Lininger & Tom Lininger, Unlocking the "Virtual Cage" of
Wildlife Surveillance, 27 DUKE ENV'T. L. & POL'Y F. 207, 214-15, 219-23 (2017)
(discussing the benefits-and harms-of wildlife surveillance); Peter P. Swire,
Financial Privacy and the Theory of High-Tech Government Surveillance, 77
WASH. U. L.Q. 461, 486-88 (1999) (discussing the benefits of government
surveillance in the financial sector: "One can therefore see how detailed financial
records can further the central goals of law enforcement, namely, the detection,
deterrence, and proof of illegal activity"); David Thaw, Surveillance at the Source,
103 KY. L.J. 405, 411-14 (2015) (discussing generally the benefits of surveillance
in a variety of contexts); Brandon C. Welsh et. al., Effectiveness and Social Costs
of Public Area Surveillance for Crime Prevention, 11 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. Sci.
111,112-13, 120-21 (2015) (noting the benefits of natural surveillance, such as
lighting and defensible space in reducing crime by improving visibility, and the
benefits of formal surveillance, such as security personnel and place managers
who act as visible deterrents).
99. LYoN, supra note 21, at 13.
100. Id. at 3.
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enhancing election transparency. 10 1 In another, election surveillance
is an exertion of menacing "control," serving nefarious ends like
intimidating voters. 102
Transparency and surveillance both involve exertions of control.
We think of transparency measures as vehicles to enable government
accountability. But fundamentally, transparency measures are in
place to enable citizen control of government actors and
institutions. 103
As Frederick Schauer describes, transparency's
function is "the embodiment of public control as an end in itself."1 04
Both transparency and surveillance measures enable watchers to
exert control over the objects of their gaze; both perform a disciplining
function. Being watched-by a man in a trench coat, by constituents,
by the state, or by fellow citizens-results in objects of the gaze
adjusting their behavior to accommodate social norms, legal
requirements, or other purposes for which transparency or
surveillance mechanisms are in place.105
Control functions of transparency and surveillance can thus be
leveraged both in service of the common good (e.g., improving law
abiding on the part of surveillance targets) or in service of injurious
aims (e.g., manipulation and incursions into civil liberties).
2.

Covert vs. Overt Surveillance

Targets within transparency systems know their actions will be
watched and are routinely required by law to take part in
documenting, displaying, or releasing information about their
activities to the public.1 06 The goals of transparency-deterrence,
accountability, and an informed public-are served by a presumption
of openness of which public servants are on notice.
101. See, e.g., Brooke Singman, GOP Recruits 4,000 Poll Watchers for Most
Aggressive Ballot Security Operation in Georgia History', Fox NEWS (Dec. 9,
2020),
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/georgia-gop-poll-watchers-senaterunoffs (demonstrating how conservative politicians and news outlets touted
election surveillance as a needed and positive effort).
102. See, e.g., Nick Corasaniti, G.O.P. Seeks to Empower Poll Watchers,
Raising
Intimidation
Worries,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
1,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/01/us/politics/republican-pollwatchers.html
(showing that Democrats and minority voters in Georgia were worried about the
potential for election surveillance to intimidate and negatively influence voters).
103. Schauer, supra note 92, at 1348.
104. Id. at 1349. Transparency as control arises in other contexts outside the
scope of this Article. Id. at 1341 (showing as an example that shareholders and
regulators mandate corporate transparency to exert control over corporations).
105.

1 JEREMY BENTHAM,

FarmingDefended,

in WRITINGS ON THE POOR LAWS

276, 277 (Michael Quinn ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2001) (1797) ("[T]he more
strictly we are watched, the better we behave.").
106. Deborah G. Johnson & Kent A. Wayland, Surveillanceand Transparency
as SociotechnicalSystems ofAccountability, in SURvEILLANCE AND DEMOCRACY 19,
24 (Kevin D. Haggerty & Minas Samatas, eds., 2010).
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the
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put).
being
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about
collected
to covert
subject
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oblivious
involve
surveillance
of
forms
surveillance.
But paradigmatic models of surveillance are consciously overt: as
regimes, knowledge on the part of the target is a
transparency
in
108
In philosopher Jeremy Bentham's prison
feature.
central
is the prisoner's full awareness of
requirement
panopticon, a key
109
This is so
control and discipline.
of
mechanism
a
as
being watched
signaling
occurs;
even
surveillance
the
whether
of
regardless
design
surveillance
in
this
see
We
purpose.
its
serves
surveillance
more broadly: signs alerting customers, would-be trespassers, or
employees that their actions are being monitored by surveillance
cameras-whether or not cameras are present and whether or not
110
Overt surveillance need not be
anyone is behind the camera to see.
11 1
Sometimes the point of the surveillance system is
confrontational.
to vaguely signal its existence, putting the target on alert that "we
are watching."
In the election context, the presence of surveillance-or the
target's perception of it-has complex impacts. Not all are negative.
One study, for example, suggests that there may be positive effects of
112
This 2008 study involved
voters knowing they are being watched.
researchers sending voters a letter informing them that researchers
were studying turnout in their area.113 The effect was that more
voters in that jurisdiction turned out to vote, suggesting that
prompted
knowledge of being the subject of a voter-behavior study114
changed behavior in the form of greater civic engagement.
107. Id. at 28.
108. See Thomas J.L. van Rompay et al., The Eye of the Camera: Effects of
Security Cameras on Prosocial Behavior, 41 ENV'T & BEHAv. 60, 62 (2009)
(reviewing previous research documenting the prosocial effects of security
cameras); see also Lorraine Mazerolle et al., Social Behavior in Public Space: An
Analysis of BehavioralAdaptations to CCTV, 15 SEc. J. 59, 72 (2002).
109. BENTHAM, supra note 105.
110. Mazerolle et al., supranote 108 at 73.
111.

BENTHAM, supra note 105.

112. Alan S. Gerber et al., Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from
a Large-Scale Field Experiment, 102 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 33, 40 (2008).
113. Id. at 38-39 (2008) (noting that researchers were able to increase voter
turnout by sending a letter to voters telling them they were being studied).
114. Margot E. Kaminski & Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect: First
Amendment Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U. RICH. L.
REV. 465, 490 (2015) ("The knowledge that someone was observing their behavior
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Potential positive impacts of voters' awareness of being watched,
however, contrast with the long history of surveillance (both
confrontational and more subtly signaled) playing a constant role in
suppression of minority voters.11 5 The "we are watching" form of
voter intimidation lurked in Jim Crow culture and has been a
consistent feature of ballot security tactics in modern elections
since. 116 Voting is of course not the only context in which overt
surveillance discriminates against historically disadvantaged
groups.1 1 7 Surveillance studies scholars have documented how
disadvantaged or marginalized people and groups wishing to avoid or
otherwise reduce the impacts of surveillance change their behavior to
do so-including removing themselves from surveilled spaces to their
detriment.11 8 In elections, overt surveillance-whether subtle or
not-has been effective in suppressing minority voting.

caused potential voters to behave in a way they considered more socially
desirable."). This same intuition has propelled the practice of sending mailers to
voters using publicly available voter history data to encourage voters to vote. See,
e.g., Ken Dixon, 'CT Voter Project' Sends Mailers with Public Information on
Voting History, CT PosT (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.ctpost.com/politics/article/
CT-Voter-Project-sends-mailers-with-public-15679355.php
(describing mailers
sent to Connecticut voters with the following message as a means of encouraging
voter turnout: "We're sending this mailing to you, your friends, your neighbors,
your colleagues at work and your community members to publicize who does and
who does not vote"). Outside the voting context, others have noted that
surveillance has positive effects in other ways-principal among them is
encouraging law-abiding behavior. See, e.g., Hille Koskela, 'The Gaze Without
Eyes': Video-Surveillance and the ChangingNature of Urban Space, 24 PROGRESS
IN HUM. GEOGRAPHY 243, 243, 250 (2000) (discussing how increasing surveillance
"contributes to the production of urban space"). Reflecting on geography scholar
Hille Koskela's observation, privacy scholar Julie Cohen remarks that, 'This
point contrasts usefully with U.S. privacy theorists' comparatively single-minded
focus on the 'chilling effect' [of surveillance] .... " JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING
THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 140

(2012).
115. See discussion infra Part IV.
116. Id. See a description of ballot security efforts in Ben Cady & Tom Glazer,
Voters Strike Back: LitigatingAgainst Modern Voter Intimidation, 39 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & Soc. CHANGE 173, 177-78 (2015), for an example of this consistent feature.
117. See Mary Anne Franks, Democratic Surveillance, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
425, 441-50 (2017).
118. See, e.g., JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE,
RESISTANCE, AND THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY (2001) (describing the efforts of welfare

recipients to avoid and navigate heavy surveillance); see also COHEN, supra note
114, at 150 ("[S]cholars in surveillance studies have documented the use of
surveillance systems to control underprivileged populations."); ERVING GOFFMAN,
ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS AND OTHER
INMATES xxii (1961) (documenting the chilling effects of surveillance in confined
settings); CLIVE NORRIS & GARY ARMSTRONG, THE MAXIMUM SURVEILLANCE
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Who Is Watching?

In transparency systems, we generally understand the public as
the "watchers." Transparency relies on the government enabling the
9
public to "see what the government is up to."11 Through this lens,
transparency theorist Mark Fenster describes transparency as "a
12 0
governing institution's openness to the gaze of others."
Though paradigmatic Big Brother-style surveillance is carried
out by the state, surveillance systems have likewise historically
12 1
In Citizen Spies, Joshua Reeves
enlisted citizen watchers too.
citizenship in the United
vigilante
of
history
long
the
documents
122
Reeves observes:
citizens.
fellow
of
gaze
the
on
relies
States that
While American society has long nurtured an ethos of rugged,
liberal individualism, at the same time it has continuously
fostered cultures of vigilance, suspicion, meddling, snooping,

and snitching. From its early displays in the witch hysterias

and Puritan moral panics of colonial New England; to the

vigilante posses of the Wild West and the Ku Klux Klan; to its
Brown Scares, Green Scares, and Red Scares; and to the [United

State]'s

recurrent

anxieties

about

immigrants,

political

dissidents, rebellious youth, criminals, and religious minorities,

SOCIETY: THE RISE OF CCTV 201 (1999) (explaining that surveillance falls
disproportionately on the socially and economically marginalized); cf. Michele
Gilman & Rebecca Green, The Surveillance Gap: The Harms of Extreme-Privacy
and Data Marginalization, 42 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 253, 253 (2018)
(describing the ways in which marginalized groups fail to secure benefits due
when falling outside surveillance architectures).
119. See U.S. Dep't of Just. v. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.
749, 780 (1989); id. at 772-73 ("The generation that made the nation thought
secrecy in government one of the instruments of Old World tyranny and
committed itself to the principle that a democracy cannot function unless the
people are permitted to know what their government is up to." (quoting Henry
Steele Commager, The Defeat of America, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 5, 1972, at 7)).
120. Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOwA L. REV. 885, 888
(2006); id. at n.1 (citing the OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 419 (2d ed. 1989) for its
definition of '"transparent, in its figurative uses, as both '[flrank, open, candid,
ingenuous,' and '[e]asily seen through, recognized, understood, or detected"').
121. Sociology scholars Kevin Haggerty and Minas Samatas remind us that
some of the most manifestly repressive and antidemocratic forms of state
surveillance-such as was conducted by East Germany's notorious secret police,
the Stasi--drew upon extensive networks of informers, common citizens who
were either enticed or coerced into informing on others. KEVIN D. HAGGERTY
MINAS SAMATAS, SURVEILLANCE AND DEMOCRACY 5 (2010).
122. See generally JOSHUA REEVES, CITIZEN SPIES: THE LONG RISE OF
AMERICA'S SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY (2017) (discussing the development of

Neighborhood Watch and other citizen surveillance programs throughout the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries).
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aligned

with

American ideals of patriotic and moral duty. 123
Surveillance studies scholars have given various names to the
concept of nonstate actors undertaking surveillance of each other. 124
Referred to as "lateral surveillance," "synoptic surveillance," the
"participatory panopticon," or, as used here, "coveillance," scholars
have recognized that surveillance systems often depend on members
of the public taking part in surveillance. 125
Coveillance, supplemented by technological tools unavailable to
previous generations, is all the mightier in the modern day. Instances
abound, from "cyber sleuths" poring over footage from the January 6
insurrection to identify participants12 6 to the Texas abortion law
leveraging coveillance tactics among members of the public to police
its requirements.1 27 Coveillance is fundamentally different than
"sousveillance," the phenomenon of citizens turning cameras on the
state-for example, using cell phones to film police.1 2 8 For both, the
rise of cheap and widely available surveillance tools has increased
citizen surveillance powers dramatically.

123. Id. at 2.
124. See, e.g., Kiel Brennan-Marquez, The ConstitutionalLimits of Private
Surveillance, 66 U. KAN. L. REV. 485, 487 (2018) (using the term "private
surveillance" in his discussion of surveillance law and the Fourth Amendment).
125. E.g., Mark Andrejevic, The Work of Watching One Another: Lateral
Surveillance, Risk, and Governance, 2 SURVEILLANCE & SoC'Y 479 (2004); Julie E.
Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 181,
196-97 (2008); Bryce Clayton Newell, Local Law Enforcement Jumps on the Big
Data Bandwagon: Automated License Plate Recognition Systems, Information
Privacy, and Access to Government Information, 66 ME. L. REV. 397, 433 (2014);
Jordana Wright et al., Securing the Home: Gender, CCTV and the Hybridized
Space of Apartment Buildings, 19 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 95, 105 (2015).
126. Tim Mak, The FBI Keeps Using Clues from Volunteer Sleuths to Find the
Jan. 6 Capitol Rioters, NPR (Aug. 18, 2021, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/
2021/08/18/1028527768/.
127. See e.g., Jon Michaels & David Noll, We Are Becoming a Nation of
Vigilantes, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/04/
opinion/texas-abortion-law.html (noting that "enforcement of the [Texas law] will
require intensive and intrusive surveillance of neighbors and colleagues"). See
generally Randy Beck, Popular Enforcement of Controversial Legislation, 57
WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forthcoming Fall 2022) (addressing issues posed by
popular enforcement mechanisms like the one in the Texas law).
128. See e.g., Chaz Arnett, Race, Surveillance, Resistance, 81 OHIO ST. L.J.
1103, 1126-28 (2020) (describing sousveillance as a means to counteract police
abuses); Steve Mann et al., Sousveillance: Inventing and Using Wearable
Computing Devices for Data Collection in Surveillance Environments, 1
SURVEILLANCE & SOc'Y 331, 332 (2003) (discussing the difference between
sousveillance and surveillance).
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The notion that modern technology should be leveraged to
increase public confidence in elections seems obvious. In a time of
public distrust of elections, why shouldn't election surveillance be the
norm? Why shouldn't every election official and poll watcher be
equipped with a body camera? Why shouldn't every election process
from ballot casting to recounts be recorded by multiple private actors?
129
The above
Then when election irregularities arise, roll the tapes!
the
surveys
Part
next
The
pause.
discussion suggests reasons for
is
concern
such
that
demonstrate
to
history of election surveillance
present.
history-and
rooted in a long and troubling
IV. A MODERN HISTORY OF ELECTION SURVEILLANCE

Interest among candidates, campaigns, voters, and others in
"watching over" elections is as old as elections themselves. As this
Part documents, however, the history of election surveillance reveals
a troubling past. 130
Election surveillance tactics during Jim Crow were far from the
predominant form of voter intimidation; Black voters were terrorized
by rampant, racist violence as a brutally effective deterrence to
For those who bravely stepped forward to engage in
voting.
democratic citizenship nevertheless, Black would-be voters were
barred from registering to vote via devices like literacy tests, poll
13 1
As described by the 1959
taxes, and racist administrative whim.
critical source of
"[t]he
Rights,
Civil
on
Federal Commission
of southern
refusal
brazen
the
was
.
..
blacks
nonvoting by
to
willingness
their
as
well
as
register,
to
blacks
authorities to permit
32
tried."1
who
those
intimidate
During the Civil Rights Era, the most common reference to
surveillance involved attempts to intimidate and threaten its Black
leaders. FBI surveillance of Civil Rights Era leaders, most notably
Dr. Martin Luther King, demonstrated the power of surveillance as
129. Regina Rini, Deepfakes and the Epistemic Backstop, 20 PHILOSOPHERS'
IMPRINT 1, 10 (2020) ("Recordings provide us with a form of perceptual evidence,
which enjoys a stronger presumptive authority than testimonial evidence. And
this is exactly why recordings are so well suited to provide the epistemic backstop.
Their stronger evidential weight allows them to provide acute correction of
deviant testimonial practices and passive regulation of trustworthy testimonial
norms.").

130. This review starts with the Jim Crow era with the understanding that
similar tactics predated it and that Black voters were one of many groups
targeted over the course of U.S. history.
131. Farrell Evans, How Jim Crow-Era Laws Suppressed the African
2021),
13,
(May
HISTORY
Generations,
for
Vote
American
https://www.history.comnews/jim-crow-laws-black-vote.
132. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOcRAcY IN THE UNITED STATES 208-09 (2000).
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an intimidation tactic. 133 Though state-sponsored surveillance of
Civil Rights Era leaders is well documented, official and private
election surveillance tactics sought to intimidate would-be Black
voters. 134 As one reporter described, "[m]any minority voters in the
South recall a time when their presence at polling or voter
registration locations was recorded and led to loss of their jobs or
homes."1 35 Historian Alexander Keyssar describes how Blacks "who
were adamant about registering could lose their jobs, have loans
called due, or face physical harm. More than a few were killed."136
In Sunflower, Mississippi, in 1967, a local church ministry
reported surveillance tactics being used to intimidate Black voters at
the polls: "[T]he chief of police greeted each citizen at the door to the
polling place, and another man used an 8mm movie camera to
photograph every Negro voter." 137 In another example, in North
Carolina, a Black teacher's three attempts to register to vote were
met with warnings that "her request to vote had been reported and
she was being watched by hostile observers .. . [implying] that she
could become a victim of violence." 138 In a third example, a
photograph in the opening pages of Gary May's book Bending Toward
Justice features a Black man attempting to register to vote in 1964.

133. GARY MAY, BENDING TOWARD JUSTICE: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 44-46 (2013) (describing FBI director

J. Edgar Hoover's surveillance campaign against Dr. King).
134. Id. at 28, 34-40 (recounting instances of private and official intimidation
acts).
135. Sherry A. Swirsky, Minority Voter Intimidation:The Problem That Won't
Go Away, 11 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 359, 363 (2002) (citing Jim Abrams,
Minority Voter IntimidationBecomes Election Eve Issue, ASSOCIATED PRESS STATE
& LOCAL WIRE (Nov. 3, 1998)).
136. KEYSSAR, supra note 132, at 207.
137. Delta Ministry Reports: May 1967, COMM'N ON THE DELTA MINISTRY,
NAT'L COUNCIL OF CHURCHES (May 1967) (on file with the Amistad Research
Center, Tulane University). Publishing the names of those who registered to vote
in the local newspaper was another intimidation tactic based on tapping fear of
exposure. See, e.g., Ole Miss. Prof. Hits State Voting Barriers, Miss. FREE PRESS
(Apr. 18, 1964), https://www.crmvet.org/info/6404_sncc_ms_vote-barriers.pdf
("[T]he whole pattern of voting requirements and of the registration form is
calculated to make the process appear to the voter to be a hopelessly formidable
one. The pattern is supposed to bristle with complexities which culminate in the
publication of the would-be voter's name in the local newspaper for two weeks. A
major purpose of all this is to so overwhelm the voter that he will not have the
audacity even to attempt registration. Behind this approach is supposed to beand all too often is-a collection of fears that someone will challenge the voter's
moral character, that he may be prosecuted for perjury, or that he may be
subjected to economic or other pressures if he attempts to register.").
138. GARRINE P. LANEY, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965, As AMENDED: ITS
HISTORY AND CURRENT ISSUES (updated March 28, 2008) (citing an account in
PAUL LEWISON, RACE, CLASS, AND PARTY: A HISTORY OF NEGRO SUFFRAGE AND
WHITE POLITICS IN THE SOUTH 119 (1963)).
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A sign posted on the wall above him reads in part, "After 10 days,
applicants' names and addresses are published for two consecutive
weeks in the newspaper," which the caption notes amounts to an
invitation to retaliate.1 39 Black citizens who attempted to register to
vote or vote knew they were being watched-with overtly threatening
40
and even lethal consequence.1
Post-Civil Rights Era election surveillance morphed into
coveillance tactics against minority voters in the name of "ballot
security."1 41 Though electronic recording devices did not feature
prominently in the effort, "we are watching" coveillance lay at the core
of the Republican National Committee's ("RNC") efforts in the early
1980s in New Jersey to prevent ineligible voters from casting
ballots. 142 In the November 1981 general election in New Jersey, the
RNC's National Ballot Security Task Force placed posters around
polling sites in minority areas signaling its intent to conduct election
surveillance:

WARNING
THIS AREA IS BEING PATROLLED
BY THE
NATIONAL BALLOT
SECURITY TASK FORCE
IT IS A CRIME TO FALSIFY A BALLOT OR
TO VIOLATE ELECTION LAWS143
The posters offered a reward for information leading to the arrest
44
The
and conviction of those violating New Jersey election laws.1

MAY, supra note 133, at viii.
140. Some evidence suggests that efforts to challenge surveillance tactics
against minority voters did not fare well in court. See generally United States v.
McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967) (upholding district court's denial of claim
that surveillance of meetings intimidated voters and citing evidence of a
legitimate motive to preserve order).
141. "Obstacles to black voting and candidacy continued in Mississippi, as
documented by the Commission during the 1970s. Blacks attempting to register
and vote faced dual registration requirements, erratic hours at the clerks offices,
intimidation and humiliation by registration officials, purging of voter
registration rolls, denials of ballots, and the location of polling places in all-white
clubs and lodges." See, e.g., U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RTS., Voting Rights and Political
Representation in the Mississippi Delta, in RACIAL AND ETHNIC TENSIONS IN
139.

AMERICAN COMMUNITIES: POVERTY, INEQUALITY, AND DISCRIMINATION VOLUME VII:
(2001), https://www.usccr.gov/files/pubs/
THE MISSISSIPPI DELTA REPORT

msdelta/ch3.htm.
142. See Richard J. Meislin, Jersey Controversy Widens Over G.O.P. Patrols
at Polls, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 1981), https://www.nytimes.com/1981/11/07/
nyregion/j ersey-controversy-widens-over-gop-patrols-at-polls.html.
143.

144.

Id.
Id.
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RNC hired off-duty police officers to patrol predominantly minority
polling places on Election Day with weapons, two-way radios, and
National Ballot Security Task Force armbands prominently
displayed.145 Members of the Task Force engaged in disruptive
behavior, such as harassing election workers, stopping and
questioning prospective voters, and blocking voters from entering
polling places. 146
The Democratic National Committee ("DNC") challenged these
aggressive tactics in court alleging that they amounted to illegal voter
intimidation.14 7 Ultimately the RNC signed a consent decree barring
it from "interrogat[ing] prospective voters as to their qualifications to
vote prior to their entry to a polling place" and "undertaking any
ballot security activities in polling places or election districts where
the racial or ethnic composition of such districts is a factor in the
decision to . . . conduct such activities." 14 8
Despite the consent decree against the RNC, ballot security
efforts by other actors persisted. 14 9 The problem became sufficiently
acute by the late 1990s that the Department of Justice issued a

145. Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and for
Damages at 11, Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Republican Nat'l Comm., Civ. Action
No. 81-3876 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 1982), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
default/files/legacy/Democracy/dnc.v.rnc/1981%20complaint.pdf.
146. Id. at 11.
147. Id. at 13.
148. See Consent Order, Settlement Agreement, at 2(d)-(e), Democratic Nat'l
Comm. v. Republican Nat'l Comm., Civ. Action No. 81-3876 (D.N.J. Nov. 1, 1982),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-

07/1982%20consent%20decree.pdf. In 2016, the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey lifted the consent decree. See Democratic Nat'l Comm.
v. Republican Nat'l Comm., No. CV 81-03876, 2016 WL 6584915, at *1 (D.N.J.
Nov. 5, 2016) (describing the original consent decree entered in 1982, and
subsequently modified in 1987 and 2009, but refusing to extend it). As discussed
below, overt surveillance tactics in the name of large-scale "ballot security efforts"
have continued especially after a judge lifted the DNC v. RNC consent decree in
2017. See infra notes 238-46 and accompanying text.
149. See e.g., George Derek Musgrove & Hasan Kwame Jeffries, "The
Community Don't Know What's Good for Them": Local Politics in the Alabama
Black Belt During the Post-Civil Rights Era, in FREEDOM RIGHTS: NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON THE CIvIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 315 (Danielle L. McGuire & John

Dittmer eds., 2011) (describing how in a 1994 election, a "white dominated"
political organization organized an effort to videotape Black voters entering and
exiting the polls, while others photographed absentee ballots); Dave Williams,
DemocratsAccuse GOP of Intimidation;PartyAlleges that Instructions on Using
Cameras at Election Are Attempt To Discourage Blacks from Voting, AUGUSTA
CHRON., Oct. 31, 2000, at C08; Mariah Blake, The Ballot Cops, ATLANTIC (Oct.
2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/10/the-ballot-cops/
309085/ (reporting sightings of "poll watchers tailing vans that were transporting
voters to the polls, snapping photos of voters' license plates, even directing voters
to the wrong polling places").
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statement in 1998 in which then-Attorney General Janet Reno voiced
concern about election surveillance as a voter intimidation tactic:
We have heard reports that some private citizens may be
thinking of going to polling places in minority areas to try
interrupt voters by questioning them, or by photographing
them, as a part of some attempt to uncover illegal voting. These
people should take warning: we will not tolerate harassment of
minority voters under this guise. We do not sanction efforts of
individuals to take law enforcement efforts into their own

hands. 150

As recording technologies became more widely available, state
attorneys general periodically entertained questions concerning the
legality of surveillance at the polls. One of the first questions to arise
was the extent to which poll watchers already authorized to be
present in polling places could use technology to augment
observation. In a 1994 example, poll watchers wrote to the Louisiana
Attorney General seeking guidance on whether they could use video
151
The Louisiana Attorney General's
cameras at polling places.
advisory opinion concluded that so long as their actions did not
interfere with voters or election officials, poll watchers could use video
152
cameras at polling places on Election Day.
150. Statement by Attorney General Janet Reno, U.S. Dep't of Just. (Oct. 29,
8
Then1998), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/199 /October/512ag.htm.
United States Attorney General Reno concluded this statement with the
admonition that "[a]nyone who has evidence of illegal voting activity should give
that information to law enforcement officials immediately." Id. This call for
evidence of election illegality amounts to mixed messaging, which no doubt
furthers the lack of clarity on this issue. See Gil Delaney, GOP Official Vows No
Video Cameras at City PollingPlaces. INTELLIGENCER J., Nov. 3, 1998 (describing
Department of Justice press release underscoring that federal law "outlaws the
use of intimidation, threats, or coercion to prevent people from voting").
151. La. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 94-455 (Oct. 16, 1994).
152. "It is ... the opinion of this office that a video camera may be used by a
poll watcher at a polling precinct on election day, provided that this action does
not in any way interfere, influence, or otherwise affect voters or the duties of the
commissioner(s) assigned to the precinct. Additionally, we hereby recall and
repeal Opinion Number 79-1404, which is in conflict with this opinion." Id. The
Louisiana Attorney General's decision (as is often the case when it comes to
surveillance tactics) was an incremental one-the Attorney General's Office had
first been asked in 1979 whether poll watchers might use cameras inside the
polling place to take pictures (yes). See La. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 94-455 (Oct. 18,
1984) ("This conclusion reiterated the approach taken in Opinion Number 791380, which opinion concluded that, assuming no interference with a
commissioner's duties would occur, the watcher could take the photographs in the
manner described."). Then in 1991 whether poll watchers could take notes using
"mechanical devices" (yes). La. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 90-599 (Feb. 5, 1991)
("[M]echanical devices may be allowed to be used by the watcher at the polling
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The Mississippi Attorney General took a similar position in 1999,
a year after Attorney General Reno's statement. 153
Despite
acknowledging the U.S. Department of Justice's position, he noted
that his office was "aware of no state statutory prohibition for the use
of a video camera at a polling place when it is being used to record
possible violations of the election laws of the state." 154
Coveillance tactics in the name of ballot security continued. In
Houston, Texas, in 2010, according to one description, "volunteers
from the King Street Patriots . .. reportedly followed voters after they
checked in, stood directly behind voters as they filled out their ballots,
tried to peer at their ballots . . . and hovered behind voters, 'writing
down [voters'] every move as if [they were] doing something
illegal."'155
In St. Paul, Minnesota, two years later, Tea Party
affiliates reportedly "organized volunteer 'surveillance squads' to
follow buses that took voters to the polls and to photograph and
videotape any suspected irregularities at polling places."156 As
discussed further in Part V, such ballot security efforts continue to
present.157
Not all historical examples of election surveillance aimed at
detecting and deterring fraud. Starting with the passage of the
Voting Rights Act's federal observer program in 1965, Congress laid
a foundation for what is termed here "voter protection surveillance,"
that is, surveillance seeking to prevent the denial of the right to vote
and to ensure barriers to voting are catalogued and addressed.158 The
place and the watcher may gather information to transmit outside of the polling
place ... ."). When asked in 1994 about recording at the polls, having already
allowed cameras and mechanical devices previously, the Louisiana Attorney
General reasoned, poll watchers using video recording equipment to record inside
the polls seemed reasonable. See La. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 94-455 (Oct. 16, 1994).
153. See Miss. Att'y Gen. Op. 1999-0256 (Aug. 6, 1999).
154. Id. Other states blessed election observers' use of video equipment as
the question popped up around the country. In one example from 2009, the
Arizona legislature voted to allow partisan observers to bring their own video
camera to record post-election audits. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-602(B)
(2021).
155. Cady & Glazer, supra note 116, at 217 (citations omitted). In another
example in Wisconsin in 2012, "volunteers from True the Vote . .. reportedly
followed vans that were transporting voters to the polls, photographed voters'
license plates, directed voters to the wrong polling places, and hovered over
voting tables, aggressively challenging voters' eligibility .... " Id. at 218. Cady
and Glazer further note that such ballot security efforts "often appear to target
minority voters." Id. at 178.
156. Id. at 218.
157. Litigation surrounding more recent ballot security efforts is discussed
infra at Subpart V.B.
158. See James Thomas Tucker, The Power of Observation: The Role of
Federal Observers Under the Voting Rights Act, 13 MIcH. J. RACE & L. 227, 230235 (2007) (describing the role and function of federal observers under the Voting
Rights Act).
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1965 Voting Rights Act explicitly enabled federal courts and the
United States Attorney General to designate federal observers to
59
During the
ensure minority access to polling places in the South.1
Act, the
Rights
Voting
the
of
passage
the
following
years
five
first
elections
watch
to
observers
federal
5,234
assigned
General
Attorney
60
in seventy-four counties covered under the Voting Rights Act.1
Voting Rights Act-mandated observation provided a blueprint for
nonprofits and voting rights groups to establish nongovernment
versions of voter protection surveillance. Voting rights activists
deployed election coveillance tactics to "watch the watchers," seeking
to thwart voter intimidation and counteract abusive ballot security
efforts. 16 1 In one example from 2004, organizers convened a campaign
159. See 52 U.S.C. § 10305 (original version at 42 U.S.C. § 1973f (1976)).
Observers could be appointed in jurisdictions in which federal election
"examiners" were sent to register voters under 42 U.S.C. § 1973d (1976). The
Attorney General considered three factors in determining whether to send federal
observers: (1) the extent to which local officials are prepared to run fair elections;
(2) the confidence of the minority community in the local electoral process; and
(3) the possibility of racial violence or intimidation of voters. See Extension of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Const. Rts., 94th
Cong. 538 (1975) (statement of J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Att'y Gen.).
160.

See U.S. COMM'N ON GIvIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: UNFULFILLED

GOALS 10 (1981). More recently, the Department of Justice significantly curtailed
the federal observer program following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), which invalidated the coverage
formula that stood at the center of the federal observer program. See Sari
Horwitz, Justice Department Significantly Reducing Number of Federal
Observers Stationed Inside Polling Places, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-departmentseverely-curtails-election-observers-inside-polling-places-this-november/2016/
10/06/dfb49caa-875a-11e6-92c2-14b64f3d453f story.html. The following excerpt
from the Department of Justice's About Federal Observers and Election Monitors
webpage is revealing: "Prior to the Shelby County decision in 2013, a total of 153
counties and parishes in [eleven] states were certified by the attorney general for
federal observers: Alabama (22 counties), Alaska (1)[,] Arizona (4), Georgia (29),
Louisiana (12), Mississippi (51), New York (3), North Carolina (1), South Carolina
(11), South Dakota (1) and Texas (18). In light of the Shelby County decision
[which invalidated the Voting Rights Act coverage formula in Section 4(b)], the
Division is not relying on the Section 4(b) coverage formula as a way to identify
jurisdictions for election monitoring. Hence, the Division is not relying on the
AG certifications as a basis for sending federal observers to monitor elections."
About Federal Observers and Election Monitors, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice. gov/crt/about-federal-observers-and-election-monitoring
(last updated Sept. 11, 2020); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., FACT SHEET ON JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT'S ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS FOLLOWING SHELBY COUNTY DECISION,

https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/876246/download (last visited Mar. 19, 2022).
161. "Watch the watchers" is a familiar phrase indicating that those in
positions of power should be subjected to some form of public oversight. The Latin
quis custodiet ipsos custodes? is variously translated as "Who will guard the
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called the "Video Vote Vigil" to encourage members of the public to
capture on video instances of voter intimidation at the polls. 162 Many
similar efforts blossomed, including twittervotereport.com;163
YouTube's videothevote;164 and the New York Times Polling Place
Photo Project.1 65 Each involved crowdsourced efforts to mobilize
ordinary people to serve voter protection ends by uploading photos
and videos during elections in real time.1 66
By far the most predominant forms of voter protection
surveillance are organized, nationwide efforts by voter protection
networks seeking to assist individual voters and document problems

guards themselves?" or "Who watches the watchers?" John Stuart Mill used the
phrase to capture the idea of government accountability. See JOHN STUART MILL,
CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 94 (1861) ("The bad measures

or bad appointments of a minister may be checked by Parliament; and the
interests of ministers in defending, and of rival partisans in attacking, secure a
tolerably equal discussion: but quis custodiet custodes? who shall check the
Parliament?").
162. See Associated Press, Election Observers to Crowd Polling Places,
DESERET NEws (Oct. 29, 2004, 12:00 AM), https://www.deseret.com/2004/10/29/
19858487/election-observers-to-crowd-polling-places
("In Republican-leaning
Texas, an Austin-based activist group is launching a 'Video Vote Vigil' to protect
voter rights in low-income precincts. Members plan to interview willing voters
as they enter and leave polling places and publish the clips online."); see also
Jamais Cascio, The Rise of the ParticipatoryPanopticon, WORLD CHANGING (May
4, 2005, 6:16 PM), http://www.openthefuture.com/wcarchive/2005/05/therise_
ofthe participatory.html ("[I]n last November's national election, a group calling
itself 'video vote vigil' asked citizens to keep a watch for polling place abuses and
problems, recording them if possible with digital cameras or camera phones.").
163. Twitter account @votereport went live during the 2008 election under the
tagline: "A growing, grassroots effort to use Twitter to keep an eye on Election
2008," but it does not appear to have been active since. See @votereport, TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/votereport?lang=en (last visited Mar. 18, 2022).
164. See VIDEO THE VOTE, https://www.videothevote.org/video/?year=2012
(last visited Mar. 18, 2022) (having seemingly last been active in the 2012
election).
165.

See POLLING PLACE PHOTO PROJECT, http://pollingplacephotoproject.org

(last visited Mar. 18, 2022) (appearing not to include photos from citizen
journalists of elections but instead featuring blog posts on the political process;
for example, there is a July 2021 post on how to become a politician without a
law degree).
166. These efforts seem to have fallen away for reasons unknown, perhaps in
part due to abuses of these platforms. See discussion infra Part VI (discussing
Archon Fung's observations about why popular election monitoring gets
muddied). These efforts mimicked other projects outside the election context to
use video surveillance as a means of documenting abuses including human rights
abuses and police abuses. For example, in 1992, the musician Peter Gabriel
founded The Witness Project, which sought to place video cameras in the hands
of victims of human rights abuses around the world to document the abuse. See
Peter Gabriel, Peter Gabriel: Video Will Bring Us Justice in the Long Run, TIME
(May 16, 2017, 5:01 PM), https://time.com/4781418/peter-gabriel-video-justice/.
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Protection website explains, "[t]hroughout the election cycle, our
volunteers provide voter information, document problems they
encounter when voting and work with partners and volunteers on the

167. See Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, One Person, One Vote: ProtectingAccess
to the FranchiseThrough the Effective Administrationof Election Proceduresand
Protections, 40 URB. LAW. 269, 278 (2008) (noting that especially since the 2000
election, "several nonpartisan groups have organized volunteers to serve as voter
protectors or advocates in the polls on Election Day"); John Tanner, Effective
Monitoring of Polling Places, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 50, 80 (2009) (describing voter
protection election monitoring efforts and how election monitors can best legally
gather evidence for use in voter protection efforts).
168. ELECTION PROTECTION, https://866ourvote.org/ (last visited Mar. 18,
2022). An earlier iteration called "Our Vote Live" served as a precursor to
Election Protection's current efforts. Our Vote Live appears to have been active
during elections in 2008, 2009, and 2010. According to the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, "Our Vote Live logged over 86,000 calls, making it the largest
database of voting-related inquiries, problems, and discrepancies ever created
all available to the general public." See Our Vote Live, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/code/tea (last visited Mar. 18, 2022).
169. Political campaigns and parties mount similar efforts. In one law school
newspaper, two prominent election law professors shared their experience
working with the Obama campaign's sophisticated election protection effort in
2008. See Pildes and IssacharoffReflect on Working as Lawyers for the Obama
Campaign, NYU LAW NEWS (January 21, 2009), https://www.law.nyu.edu/news/
ECM_PRO0059667 ("Without giving away any secrets about exactly how this was
done, we can say that we were aware of every potential problem at polling places
throughout the battleground states. This awareness ranged from the minor
details, such as polling places that ran out of pens, to the more significant, such
as challenges to the eligibility of individual voters to vote.").
170. Lizzie Widdicombe, "ElectionProtection. Can I Have Your Name?", NEW
YORKER (Nov. 8, 2012), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/electionprotection-can-i-have-your-name (describing the scene at one Election Protection
headquarters location fielding calls from New Jersey and Ohio).
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ground to identify and remove barriers to voting." 17 1 Unlike ballot
security efforts to patrol the polls for illegal voting activity, voter
protection surveillance has not faced legal challenge, although it has
not escaped criticism. 172
With this general picture of historical and modern election
surveillance efforts as a backdrop, the next Part examines how courts
have reckoned with the right of citizens to engage in sous- and
coveillance (a legal question commonly referred to as the "right to
record"). Discussion then turns to surveying courts' reaction to
election surveillance.
V. ELECTION SURVEILLANCE AND THE COURTS

This Part first tackles "right to record" jurisprudence.173 It
demonstrates that while courts have upheld the right to record, they
have sanctioned important state interests in curbing it.
The
discussion next turns to election surveillance litigation, establishing
that courts have been willing to limit First Amendment freedoms to
171. See About Election Protection, ELECTION PROT., https://866ourvote.org/
about/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2022). As an example, according to a 2020 Election
Protection Report from New Jersey, field volunteers recorded their direct
observations and experiences interacting with poll workers and voters and took
photographs to document election-related issues. THE NEW JERSEY ELECTION
PROTECTION COALITION, ELECTION PROTECTION REPORT: ISSUES NEW JERSEY
VOTERS ENCOUNTERED FROM OCTOBER 15 THROUGH NOVEMBER 3, 2020, at 3 (2021),

https://www.lowenstein.com/media/6704/new-jersey-election-protection-report4292021.pdf.
172. See, e.g., James J. Woodruff II, Where the Wild Things Are: The Polling
Place, Voter Intimidation, and the FirstAmendment, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV.
253, 260-61 (2011) ("A common sight in recent election cycles has been the
wearing of hats, shirts, buttons, and other paraphernalia proclaiming the wearer
to be a 'voter rights attorney,' 'voter rights counselor,' '[candidate] voting team,'
'[state] voter rights attorney,' 'poll attorney,' or other similar message. These
individuals, some flown in from other states, have attempted to cloak themselves
in the mantle of those civil rights lawyers who caused great change in the 1960s.
However, rather than protecting a disenfranchised group's right to vote, some of
these individuals do quite the opposite: they engage in tactics to ensure certain
members of society do not get to vote." (alteration in original) (quoting Erika C.
Birg, Lawyerson the Road: The Unauthorized Practice of Law and the 2004
PresidentialElection, 9 TEX. REV. L. & POL'Y 306, 313-15 (2005))).
173. The present effort confines itself to physical surveillance of election
processes. A different angle involves what surveillance studies scholars Kevin
Haggerty and Richard Ericson refer to as the "surveillant assemblage." Kevin D.
Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson, The Surveillant Assemblage, 51 BRIT. J. SOCIO.
605, 605 (2000). As they understand it, the surveillant assemblage is not
concerned with targeting a single body in a single physical space through many
different modes but is instead rooted in "transforming the body into pure
information, such that it can be rendered more mobile and comparable." Id. at
613. I plan to explore the impact of the surveillant assemblage on voters and
elections in later work.

/
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prevent voter intimidation and disruption of the voting process. But
courts have been less willing to curb election surveillance when those
voter intimidation and process disruption are not directly implicated.
The last Subpart examines ways in which current statutory and
jurisprudential frames fail to fully address election surveillance
harms.
The First Amendment and the Right to Record
With portable, sophisticated surveillance equipment in our
pockets, our ability to record not only official acts but also each other
is now a given. Outside the election context, citizen surveillance has
caused social tumult and shed needed light, most notably on police
abuses. From George Holliday's video of police beating Rodney King
to Darnella Frazier's cell phone footage of the murder of George Floyd,
174
Americans well understand the power of sousveillance.
Less in the limelight but equally contentious in the courts are
longstanding coveillance conflicts. Unlike sousveillance, which many
see as providing a needed check on government power, coveillance is
often associated with invasive press practices (think paparazzi) and
generally viewed as privacy invasive (think stalking) with few social
benefits other than satisfying the prurient interest. 175
In her seminal article, The Right to Record, privacy law scholar
Margot Kaminski establishes that courts routinely recognize the
17 6
Yet she
right to record as a First Amendment-protected activity.
notes that courts permit the state to limit the right to record,
highlighting examples such as when the target of the recording is not

A.

174. Seth Abramovitch, Flashback:How a PlumberAltered History by Taping
the Attack on Rodney King, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Mar. 3, 2021, 1:15 PM),
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/lifestyle/lifestyle-news/flashback-how-a644
plumber-altered-history-by-taping-the-attack-on-rodney-king-4141
commotion
the
at
(describing how George Holliday pointed his new video camera
Fernando
San
the
in
balcony
apartment
his
from
feet
unfolding less than 100
Valley); Elahe Izadi & Darnella Frazier, the Teen Who Filmed George Floyd's
Murder, Awarded a Pulitzer Citation, WASH. PosT (June 11, 2021, 1:33 PM),
2
https://www.washingtonpost.com/media/ 021/06/1 1/darnella-frazier-pulitzergeorge-floyd-witness/.
175. See, e.g., Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,
4 HARv. L. REV. 193, 196 (1890) ("To satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual
relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily papers. To occupy the
indolent, column upon column is filled with idle gossip, which can only be
procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle."); Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d
986, 998-99 (2d Cir. 1973) (affirming an injunction requiring a photographer to
stay away from Jacqueline Onassis and her children).
176. Margot E. Kaminski, Privacy and the Right to Record, 97 B.U. L. REV.
167, 168 (2017).
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a matter of public concern (content) or when the recording takes place
in private as opposed to public (location). 177
As to content, Kaminski cites two key reasons for why the First
Amendment protects the right to record: (1) it can improve democratic
self-governance and (2) recordings can contribute to the marketplace
of ideas.1 78 The First Amendment would seem squarely protective of
election surveillance under both rationales.
As to location, when the target of a recording is in a nonpublic
space--a living room or a bathroom, for example-courts have upheld
the privacy rights of individuals against being recorded. 179 The right
to record in public spaces is much thornier. How and under what
circumstances can a person legally standing in a public place be
prohibited from recording what their eyes already behold?
In general, courts are protective of the right to record in public
spaces. 180 Glik v. Cunniffel8l is illustrative. In Glik, a bystander used
his cell phone to record the police forcibly arresting a suspect on the
Boston Common.18 2 When police saw Glik recording, they asked him
to stop.183 Glik replied, "I am recording this. I saw you punch him."184
Police promptly arrested Glik for unlawful recording under
Massachusetts's wiretap law. Weighing Glik's rights under the First
Amendment, the First Circuit concluded that the First Amendment
"protects the filming of government officials in public spaces." 185
177. Id. at 209 ("The home is in many ways the easy case. Protection for
privacy in the home is paramount in case law.").
178. Id. at 180-81.
179. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) ("[P]reserving the
sanctity of the home, the one retreat to which men and women can repair to
escape from the tribulations of their daily pursuits, is surely an important
value."); Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971) ("Plaintiff's
den was a sphere from which he could reasonably expect to exclude
eavesdropping .... [H]e . .. should not be required to take the risk that what is
heard and seen will be transmitted by photograph or recording .... ").
180. See Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 355-56 (3d Cir. 2017);
Turner v. Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 689 (5th Cir. 2017); ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679
F.3d 583, 595-600, 608 (7th Cir. 2012). See generally Aidan J. Coleman
Katharine M. Janes, Caught on Tape: Establishing the Right of Third-Party
Bystanders to Secretly Record the Police, 107 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 166, 168 (2021)
("Federal appellate courts across the country have consistently recognized the
existence of a valid First Amendment right in recording the police in public
spaces.").
181. 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011).
182. Id. at 79.
183. Id. at 80.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 83. The right to record police can and should be distinguished from
election surveillance. First, interactions between police and citizens are fraught
with violence and involve abuses that too often lead to physical injury and death.
Violence is decidedly not part of the conduct of elections. The right to record
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Courts, however, are not universally protective of the right to
record in public. Courts have sanctioned restrictions on the right to
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abortion clinics. 192 First Amendment freedoms do not apply in all
public spaces, as these freedoms can sometimes imperil other
193
constitutionally protected rights.
A final buffer zone case most relevant here is Burson v.
Freeman,194 a First Amendment challenge to a Tennessee statute

elections does not involve state actors who carry weapons and thus present a
physical threat. Second, an important distinction is that police officers operating
in the field often lack accountability, which recording can provide. Jocelyn
Simonson, Beyond Body Cameras:DefendingA Robust Right to Record the Police,
104 GEo. L.J. 1559, 1563-64 (2016) (describing the right to record police as a
critical accountability mechanism). Election processes are bounded to certain
places and times and are already under intense, routine scrutiny, with multiple
levels of checks and balances.
186. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 1 (1978) (holding that prison
inmates have a privacy interest in not being recorded and broadcast by a
television station).

187. Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609-10 (1978) (noting
that neither the First nor Sixth Amendments require broadcasting trials to the
public); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 534-35 (1965) (prohibiting televising from
the courtroom does not violate the First Amendment); United States v. Kerley,
753 F.2d 617, 622 (7th Cir. 1985) (concluding that the exclusion of cameras from
federal courtrooms does not violate the First Amendment).
188. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
189. Id. at 315, 318 (holding that the government interest in preventing
disruption justified a ban on congregating in a 500-foot zone outside a foreign
embassy).

190. Id. at 323-24.
191. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
192. Id. at 707, 735 (upholding a Colorado law creating an eight-foot floating
buffer zone around a person within 100 feet of a healthcare facility).
193. Id. at 716-17 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
The Supreme Court cited Justice Brandeis,
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
explaining, "[t]he unwilling listener's interest in avoiding unwanted
communication has been repeatedly identified in our cases. It is an aspect of the
broader 'right to be let alone' that one of our wisest Justices characterized as 'the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."' Id.
194. 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
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prohibiting electioneering (solicitation of votes and distribution of
campaign materials) within 100 feet of a polling place. 195 One of the
rare cases to survive a strict scrutiny analysis, the Supreme Court
found the state's interests in preventing voter intimidation and
election fraud sufficiently compelling and the ban itself narrowly
tailored enough to meet those interests.1 96 Importantly, the Supreme
Court viewed the buffer zone around the polling place as a space of
privacy for voters to be free of intimidation and coercion. 197
The Supreme Court acknowledged the difficulty of applying a
narrow tailoring analysis to the one-hundred-foot rule. 198 If states
must prove that the chosen boundary around polling places is
"perfectly tailored to deal with voter intimidation and election
fraud,"1 99 the Court reasoned,
a [s]tate's political system [would] sustain some level of damage
before the legislature could take corrective action. Legislatures,
we

think,

should

be

permitted

to

respond

to

potential

deficiencies in the electoral process with foresight rather than
reactively, provided that the response is reasonable and does

not significantly impinge on constitutionally protected rights. 2 00

Notably, Justice Scalia would have gone further in Burson.
Scalia stressed that "streets and sidewalks around polling places have
traditionally not been devoted to assembly and debate." 201 On this
basis, Justice Scalia argued that strict scrutiny should not apply to
20 2
the electioneering statute.
Burson provides a nice segue into a review of election
surveillance litigation. Election surveillance jurisprudence thus far
reveals that courts are protective of voters and the voting process.
But when these interests are not as directly at issue, those seeking to
prevent election surveillance have been less lucky in court.
B.

Election Surveillance and the Courts

Relatively few courts have examined the rights of poll watchers
and other members of the public to use devices to record election
processes before, during, and after Election Day. The Supreme Court
has not considered the question directly. Perhaps the case most on
195. Id. at 193-94.
196. Id. at 198-200, 211.
197. Id. at 204 ("One commentator remarked of the New York law of 1888:
'We have secured secrecy; and intimidation by employers, party bosses, police
officers, saloonkeepers and others has come to an end."').
198. Id. at 208-10.
199. Id. at 209.
200. Id. at 209 (quoting Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 19596 (1986)).
201. Id. at 216 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
202. Id.

2022]

ELECTION SURVEILLANCE

327

20 3
In Poniktera,
point is from California in 2010, Poniktera v. Seiler.
that election
arguing
registrar
local
a
sued
watcher
a San Diego poll
the
limit[ing]
"improperly
by
Amendment
First
the
officials violated
other
and
cameras
with
voting
election
document
to
ability of citizens
recording devices."20 4 Local officials contended that the prohibition of
photography and recording devices was consistent with California's
statute prohibiting the photographing of voters within 100 feet of a
205
polling place with the intent to intimidate.
The state appeals court concluded that, for purposes of First
Amendment analysis, the inside of a polling place is a nonpublic
forum. 206 The court cited a 2010 opinion from the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, standing for the proposition that "[t]he
only expressive activity involved [at the polling place] is each voter's
communication of his own elective choice and this has long been
2 07
carried out privately-by secret ballot in a restricted space."
Consistent with Burson, the court concluded that "polling places have
not been opened for public discourse, and indeed are subject to
significant restraints on expressive conduct within the polling
station." 208
The court blessed the State's interest in preventing voter
intimidation, finding that

[t]he state could reasonably conclude voters may be deterred
from voting if they know (either in advance or upon arriving at

the polling station) their presence will be photographically
recorded, even by photographers claiming to have the most
benign of intents, because the voter cannot be expected to read

the mind of the photographer and the voter is not required to

203. 181 Cal. App. 4th 121 (2010).
204. Id. at 125. The poll watcher manual used for Plaintiff's training included
the following statement: "Photography and videotaping are not allowed by the
public or voters during voting hours. However, if someone would like to
photograph the seals on voting equipment prior to the opening of the polls or after
the polls close they may be permitted to do so." Id. at 126.
205. Id.; CAL. ELEC. CODE § 18541 (West 2021).
206. In 1983, the Supreme Court established different levels of scrutiny
applicable to different categories of spaces depending on whether they were
traditionally open to First Amendment activity, newly open to First Amendment
activity, or not traditionally open to First Amendment Activity. See Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Loc. Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983). Other federal
courts have followed since applying this approach. See, e.g., United Food & Com.
Workers Loc. 1099 v. City of Sidney, 364 F.3d 738, 749-750 (6th Cir. 2004);
Marlin v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 236 F.3d 716, 719 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Cotz
v. Mastroeni, 476 F. Supp. 2d 332, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
207. Marlin, 236 F.3d at 719.
208. Poniktera, 181 Cal. App. 4th at 136.
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protestations of

The court also considered the State's interest in preventing
disruption of the voting process. The court held that the State could
reasonably move to prevent disruption arising from involving poll
workers in the unenviable job of refereeing disputes between poll
watchers seeking to use cameras in polling places and voters seeking
to avoid being caught in the frame. 2 1O
Ultimately, the California court supported the rights of poll
watchers to observe the conduct of elections but believed the
photography ban inside the polling places protected both voter
privacy and smooth election administration. 211 To support its finding,
the court referenced cases in which, outside the context of election
surveillance, courts have held that poll watching is not a fundamental
right that enjoys distinct First Amendment protections. 2 1 2
Evidence supports the conclusion that disruptions caused by
recording in polling places have the potential to disrupt the voting
process. 213 Testifying in a Michigan ballot selfie case in 2017, election
209. Id. at 137. Notice the nod to overt surveillance and its power to
intimidate voters far from polling places-here the court acknowledges that the
surveillance harm could manifest in voters steering clear of the polls upon
learning of the presence of surveillance there.
210. Id. at 137-38.
211. The Supreme Court upheld First Amendment rights of citizens inside
polling places in Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876 (2018).
Mansky involved a challenge to a prohibition on wearing clothing with a political
message inside the polling place. Id. at 1882. Mansky can be distinguished from
prohibitions of recording in polling places. In Mansky, the Supreme Court hinged
its decision on the vague prohibition and the discretion it unleashed in discerning
what counts as "political" for purposes of the ban. Id. at 1880 ("[T]he unmoored
use of the term 'political' in the Minnesota law, combined with haphazard
interpretations the State has provided in official guidance and representations to
this Court, cause Minnesota's restriction to fail .... "). Prohibitions on recording
in polling places suffer from no such vagueness problem or potential for unmoored
discretion in enforcement.
212. See Cotz v. Mastroeni, 476 F. Supp. 2d 332, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) ("[P]oll
watching is not incidental to this right and has no distinct First Amendment
protection."); Turner v. Cooper, 583 F. Supp. 1160, 1161-62 (N.D. Ill. 1983)
(holding that the act of poll watching is not protected by the First Amendment).
213. In a helpful frame, Professor Kaminski describes the state's interest in
restricting the right to record as one of enabling "boundary management." See
Margot E. Kaminski, Regulating Real-World Surveillance, 90 WASH. L. REV.
1113, 1113 (2015). Sometimes, Professor Kaminski explains, "a law enables
boundary management by preserving an environment or context as free from
recording." Id. at 1131. In other instances, the boundary management acts in
service of "keeping things the way they were before the introduction of new
surveillance technology." Id. The idea of boundary management is the state
creating circumstances by which individuals can themselves navigate and control
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expert Charles Stewart noted that allowing photography in polling
places could lead to negative consequences, including delay and
increased wait times, disruption, decreased voter confidence in the
election process, and decreased confidence in the secrecy of the
ballot. 214 The Eighth Circuit agreed with Stewart's assessment,
holding that the state's ban on polling place photography "advances
several serious governmental interests: preserving the privacy of
other voters, 215 avoiding delays and distractions at the polls,
216
preventing vote buying, and preventing voter intimidation."
Another ballot selfie case from 2017 furthers the argument that
photography in polling places may constitutionally be banned. In
217
a federal district court
Silberbergv. Board of Elections of New York,
in polling
photography
on
ban
statutory
a
considered
York
in New
2 18
that the
found
court
the
scrutiny,
intermediate
Applying
places.
Amendment
First
under
fell
photography
place
polling
on
ban
protection but held that the government interest in protecting the
boundaries regarding which of their actions and utterances may be recorded. It
is about preserving dignity and status quo in the face of advancing technology
and about preventing "chilling effects, power imbalances, [and] vulnerability
harms" that unrestricted recording might enable. Id. at 1139.
214. Defendant's Expert Report of Charles Stewart III, Ph.D. at 4-5,
Crookston v. Johnson, 370 F. Supp. 3d 804 (W.D. Mich. 2018) (No. 1:16cv-01109)
("Among the quantifiable effects, allowing photographs of voters and their ballots
will likely increase the amount of time necessary to check in, vote, and scan a
ballot. This additional 'service time' will, in turn, increase the amount of time
necessary to check in, vote, and scan a ballot, thus increasing the likelihood that
the quality of service will be decreased in polling places in Michigan; and increase
wait times to check in, vote, and scan ballots. The unmeasurable effects will be
similarly important. Among these are likely to be an increase in disruptions in
polling places, which will interrupt the smooth flow of voters coming to the polls
and decrease among voters a sense that the voting process is being run fairly, an
increase in the level of voter intimidation due to the greater presence of cameras
being used in polling places, and to greater conflict in polling places as their use
is disputed, and an increase in the surprisingly common belief among non-voters
that one's ballot is not secret. Indeed, as photographs begin appearing in which
other voters and their ballots are displayed, the mistaken belief that one's ballot
is not secret may become less mistaken.").
215. The clash between voters' First Amendment rights versus the right to
record is thorny. As privacy scholar Scott Skinner-Thompson points out,
"[w]idespread citizen recording-particularly if aimed at those engaged in
tandem
in
democracy-works
participatory
of
forms
embodied
with . .. surveillance laws to intensify the privacy burdens on entering the public
square and participating in society." Scott Skinner-Thompson, Recording as
Heckling, 108 GEO. L.J. 125, 159 (2019). While Skinner-Thompson is referring to
participating in public protests, the idea applies equally to engaging in the
election process. Widespread election surveillance could easily lead to chilling
effects that would be very hard to measure and could well be widespread. Id.
216. Crookston v. Johnson, 841 F.3d 396, 400 (6th Cir. 2016).
217. 272 F. Supp. 3d 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
218. Id. at 459.
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voting process (for example, avoiding longer wait times at the polls)
and voter privacy justified the restriction. 219
Election surveillance outside polling place buffer zones has
encountered mixed reactions from judges.
During the 2016
presidential election, the Arizona Democratic Party sought a
preliminary injunction to stop Republican ballot integrity efforts to
"follow other voters and interrogate them as to their votes, to record
other voters' license plates, to photograph and video-record other
voters, and to call 911 if they suspect someone has engaged in voter
fraud." 220
The Plaintiff alleged that these activities would
"constitute ... an attempt to intimidate and/or threaten voters for
voting or attempting to vote" 221 in violation of voter intimidation
provisions in the Voting Rights Act, 222 the Ku Klux Klan Act, 223 and
Arizona statute. 224

219. Id. at 479-80.
220. Ariz. Democratic Party v. Ariz. Republican Party, No. CV-16-03752PHX-JJT, 2016 WL 8669978, at *5 (D. Ariz. Nov. 4, 2016).
221. Id. Pressing their claim that the campaign sought to illegally intimidate
voters, Plaintiffs cited calls on the part of the Trump campaign and former
President Trump himself, who exhorted followers to keep careful watch at the
polls, adding, "[a]nd when I say 'watch,' you know what I'm talking about, right?"
Id. at *8.
222. Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act provides, "No person, whether
acting under color of law or otherwise, shall intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or
attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for voting or attempting to

vote, or .. . for urging or aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote." 52 U.S.C.
§ 10307(b).
223. The Ku Klux Klan Act provides that an injured party has a right of action
for recovery of damages against a person who, with another person, "conspire[s]
to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to
vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of
the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice
President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States." 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
For an excellent overview of federal statutes prohibiting voter intimidation, see
Cady & Glazer, supranote 116, at 181-91; Gilda R. Daniels, Voter Deception, 43
IND. L. REV. 343, 361 n.98 (2010); and FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF ELECTION
OFFENSES 33, 52, 217 (Richard C. Pilger ed.,
8th ed. 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/criminal/file/1029066/download (describing 18 U.S.C. §
241 which protects a citizen's "exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege
secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States" involving "two
or more persons" conspiring to "injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate" a voter;
18 U.S.C. § 594 which "criminalizes conduct intended to force prospective voters
to vote against their preferences, or refrain from voting, through activity
reasonably calculated to instill some form of fear"; and 18 U.S.C. § 245 which
prohibits "attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with-any person . .. voting
or qualifying to vote").
224. Arizona statute, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-1013 (2021), imposes criminal
penalty for "directly or indirectly," knowingly "practic[ing] intimidation" or
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Defendants acknowledged that Arizona law prohibited talking to
voters or taking photographs in polling places, but they asserted that
poll watchers were "still free to follow voters out into the parking lot,
ask them questions, take their pictures and photograph their vehicles
and license plate[s]." 225 The court credited this argument in denying
the Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. The court also
credited Plaintiff's argument that its goal was not to intimidate voters
but to ensure compliance with the state's new law prohibiting the
collection and return of multiple ballots (a voter assistance practice
2 26
many states allow, known pejoratively as "ballot harvesting").
The court noted that Defendants were not "training or otherwise
instructing its credentialed poll watchers, or anyone else, to follow
voters to their cars or take their photographs for reasons other than

"inflict[ing] or threaten[ing] infliction" of "injury, damage, harm or loss" in order
"to induce or compel [a voter] to vote of refrain from voting for a particular person
or measure at any election provided by law, or on account of such person having
voted or refrained from voting at an election." Numerous state statutes contain
similar provisions prohibiting voter intimidation. See, e.g., Arkansas, ARK. CODE.
ANN. § 7-1-104 (2021) (exemplifying a criminal statute that prohibits "any threat
or attempt to intimidate any elector or the family, business, or profession of the
elector" and any person who "interfere[s] with or .. . prevent[s] any qualified
elector from voting at any election or . .. attempt[s] to interfere with
or .. . prevent[s] any qualified elector from voting at any election"); Florida, FLA.
STAT. § 104.0615 (2021) (imposing criminal liability for "directly or indirectly
us[ing] or threaten[ing] to use force, violence, or intimidation or any tactic of
coercion or intimidation to induce or compel an individual" to vote or refrain from
voting); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-567(a) (2021) (prohibiting "any person
who uses or threatens to use force and violence, or acts in any other manner to
intimidate any other person" to vote or refrain from voting or registering); Iowa,
IOWA CODE § 39A.4 (2021) (prohibiting willfully "[1]oitering, congregating,
electioneering, posting signs, treating voters, or soliciting votes, during the
receiving of the ballots" and/or "interrupting, hindering, or opposing a voter while
in or approaching the polling place for the purpose of voting"); Michigan, MICH.
COMP. LAws § 168.932(a) (2021) (barring a person from attempting "by means of
bribery, menace, or other corrupt means or device, either directly or indirectly, to
influence an elector in giving his or her vote, or to deter the elector from, or
interrupt the elector in giving his or her vote at any election held in this state");
Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-604(A) (2021) (making it unlawful for "any person
(i) to loiter or congregate within 40 feet of any entrance of any polling place; (ii)
within such distance to .. . in any manner attempt to influence any person in
casting his vote; (iii) to hinder or delay a qualified voter in entering or leaving a
polling place").
225. Ariz. DemocraticParty, 2016 WL 8669978, at *6.
226. Table 10: Ballot Collection Laws, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES
(Jan. 6, 2022), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/vopptable-10-who-can-collect-and-return-an-absentee-ballot-other-than-thevoter.aspx (describing state statutes permitting and not permitting family
members and others to return absentee ballots as agents or designees).
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suspected ballot harvesting." 227 In its findings, the court underscored
the First Amendment rights of Defendants and their supporters. 228
So long as Defendants proffered a legitimate reason for videotaping
voters outside the seventy-five-foot zone (here policing potentially
illegal behavior), the court found the balance weighed against issuing
a preliminary injunction to stop Defendants' election surveillance
plan. 229
Also in 2016, members of the Oath Keepers, an American antigovernment militia, issued the following plea to supporters in New
Jersey:
[W]e call on you to form up incognito intelligence gathering and
crime spotting teams and go out into the public on election day,
dressed to blend in with the public, without any Oath Keepers
hat or T shirt on, and with video, still camera, and notepad in

hand, to look for and document suspected criminal vote fraud or
intimidation activities, by any individuals, groups, or parties,

and then report these incidents to your local police. 230

In denying a restraining order to prevent such activities, the
court found particularly salient that the Oath Keepers instructed
their followers to conduct election surveillance covertly. 231 In such
circumstances, the court reasoned that voters could not be
intimidated because they would be unaware that they were targets of.
Oath Keepers' covert coveillance:
[T]he Oath Keepers have directed their members "NOT [to] film

in an obvious manner. In general, stay out of view and observe
at a distance. Observe and record covertly, report accurately."
The Oath Keepers further advise their members to "make it
hard on the criminal bad guys to know if they are being observed

and filmed." As such, the Court fails to see how Defendant's

227. Ariz. DemocraticParty, 2016 WL 8669978, at *6. This was noted despite
evidence introduced at trial that the Defendants' website exhorted supporters: "If
you observe anything improper or illegal at the polls on Election Day please use
this form to report it to the Arizona Republican Party. Submit any photos, videos,
or other materialsas evidence. Thank you for your service to ensure the integrity
of elections in Arizona!" (emphasis added). Id. at *7.
228. Id. at *12 ("Plaintiff has not provided the Court with a narrowly tailored
injunction that would not unintentionally sweep within its ambit other activities
that constitute exercise of freedom of speech.").
229. Id. at *7-8.
230. N.J. Democratic State Comm. v. N.J. Oath Keepers, No.: 16-8230 (JLL),
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154272, at *3--4 (D.N.J. Nov. 7, 2016). Plaintiffs sought a
restraining order citing federal voter intimidation prohibitions in the Voting
Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10307(b), and the Ku Klux Klan Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
Id. at *2.
231. Id. at *6.
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members could intimidate voters who are not even aware of
their presence. 232
The Arizona and New Jersey courts both distinguished Daschle
v. Thune, 233 a 2004 case from North Dakota, in which the Plaintiff,
then-Senator Tom Daschle, successfully obtained a temporary
restraining order prohibiting Defendants from following Native
American voters and recording license plates of vehicles transporting
234
The Oath
Native American voters to and from polling places.
in
surveillance
election
because
Daschle
Keepers court distinguished
New
the
whereas
Americans,
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targeted
Daschle specifically
Jersey court found "no evidence that Defendants" Call to Action' [was]
235
The Arizona
targeted at any particular group or groups of voters."
Daschle, the
in
that
grounds
the
on
Daschle
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and the
voters
of
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a
against
acted
already
had
Defendants
as
actions
Defendants'
perceived
already
voters
of
targeted group
236
that
case,
Arizona
the
in
reasoned,
court
The
intimidation.
Plaintiffs produced no evidence that Defendants' actions would result
in voter intimidation:
[Defendants'] public statements with regard to following and
photographing voters outside the [seventy-five-foot] limit were
made only in the context of helping law enforcement enforce
the . .. ballot harvesting law and could not reasonably have
been read to address voters generally, much less intimidate

them. Moreover, credentialed poll watchers for both political
parties are established and regulated by Arizona law, and there

is no evidence of even a single incident between a credentialed
poll watcher and voter since at least 2006.237

Recalling the care and control surveillance dichotomy, these
decisions demonstrate that election coveillance harms is are in the
eye of the beholder. The same election coveillance effort might strike
some as "care" (ensuring compliance with voting laws) and others as
worrisome "control" (here, voter intimidation).
In the lead up to the 2020 election, national leaders (including
then-President Trump) called for "armies" of poll watchers to ferret
out election fraud. 238 Plaintiffs challenged these efforts in court,
232. Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
233. No. 04-CV-04177 (D.S.D. Nov. 2, 2004) (CourtListener).
234. Id.
235. Oath Keepers, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154272, at *4.
236. Ariz. DemocraticParty, 2016 WL 8669978, at *7-8.
237. Id. at *7.
238. The Trump campaign put out the call for an "army" of election observers
to observe at the polls and ensure that only eligible voters cast ballots. Former
President Trump himself issued a call from the debate stage at the first
presidential debate on September 29, 2020. Jarrett Renshaw & Joseph Tanfani,

334

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

seeking to ensure they did not intimidate voters or disrupt the
election process. 239 In one example, a month before the November
2020 election, an anonymous "consortium of business owners and
concerned [private] citizens" sought to hire a private security firm
called Atlas to patrol the polls in Minnesota. 240 Municipal leaders and
voting rights groups went to court, arguing that a paramilitary
presence would intimidate minority voters and that election judges
(already in short supply) would quit in fear of escalation. 241 Citing
Section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act, which prohibits any person
from attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce those voting,
attempting to vote, or aiding and encouraging others to vote, 242 a
federal district court in Minnesota issued a preliminary injunction
enjoining Defendants from mobilizing a private patrol at the polls. 24 3
Candidates calling on supporters to serve as observers is nothing
out of the ordinary-indeed, the U.S. system relies on candidate and
political party representatives as primary overseers of elections. 244
Yet the imagery of an "army" of observers and the steady drumbeat
of false claims about mass illegal voting had many worried in 2020,
not just about voter intimidation but about violent clashes at the polls

Cellphones in Hand, Army for Trump' Readies Poll Watching Operation,
REUTERS (Oct. 7, 2020, 6:14 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usaelection-poll-watchers-insight/cellphones-in-hand-army-for-trump-readies-pollwatching-operation-idUSKBN26S1J5 ("In a recruitment video posted on Twitter
in September seeking volunteers for this 'Army for Trump,' the president's son,
Donald Trump Jr., made the unfounded claim that Democrats plan to 'add
millions of fraudulent ballots' to rig the results. Trump repeatedly has refused
to commit to accepting the outcome of November's election. During the Sept. 29
presidential debate, he exhorted his supporters to 'go into the polls and watch
very carefully."'); see also Michael Biesecker & Garance Burke, Trump Army' of
Poll Watchers Led by Veteran of Fraud Claims, AP NEWS (Nov. 2, 2020),
https://apnews.com/article/mike-roman-trump-poll-watchers-election-e 110e6c9
e62c9c8520f4a1a2040d8cfc (quoting an email sent by the head of the Minneapolis
police union that aimed to recruit retired officers to serve as "Poll Challengers,"
which explained that "Poll Challengers do not 'stop' people, per se but act as our
eyes and ears in the field and call our hotline to document fraud"); First
Presidential Debate, C-SPAN (Sept. 29, 2020), https://www.c-span.org/
debates/?debate=first.
239. See, e.g., Kristin Clarke, Voter Intimidation is Surging in 2020. Fight for
the Right that Begets all Other Rights., USA TODAY (Oct. 27, 2020, 12:01 PM)
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2020/10/27/voter-intimidation-surging-

2020-protect-minority-voters-column/6043955002/.
240. Council on Am.-Islamic Rels.-Minn. v. Atlas Aegis, LLC, 497 F. Supp. 3d
371, 375 (D. Minn. 2020).
241. Id.
242. 52 U.S.C. § 10307(b). See generally Cady & Glazer, supra note 116
(arguing for an increased use of § 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act to police ballot
security efforts).
243. Atlas Aegis, 497 F. Supp. 3d at 381.
244. Green, supra note 14, at 472-73.
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on Election Day.24 5 Particularly of concern in 2020 and beyond, such
efforts also targeted election workers (as in the Anchorage mayoral
race noted at the outset). As discussed below, preventing harm to
election workers, without whom elections could not take place,
constitutes a vital state interest in curbing abusive surveillance of
246
people administering elections.
Case law thus far suggests that election surveillance in polling
places, and buffer zones around them, can be constitutionally
prohibited. But the state interests at the center of this conclusionprotecting voters from intimidation and protecting the voting process
245. See, e.g., Amy Gardner et al., Trump's Call for Poll-Watching Volunteers
Sparks Fearof Chaos and Violence on Election Day, WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-call-for-poll-watching-

volunteers-sparks-fear-of-chaos-and-violence-on-election-day/2020/09/30/76ce06
74-0346-1leb-b7ed-141dd88560eastory.html ("President Trump's debate-stage
call for volunteers to stand watch at voting locations has prompted an
enthusiastic response from known neo-Nazis and right-wing activists, leading
many state election and law enforcement officials to prepare for voter
intimidation, arrests and even violence on Election Day."). At least in 2020, no
armies materialized. One election scholar offered a theory. Justin Levitt at
Loyola Law School in Los Angeles noted that, "[i]f you're waiting for the busloads
of fraud to arise, and what you get is small American-flag-waving democracy, you
begin to go out of your head. It's like sitting in a field waiting for the UFOs and
the UFOs never show up. And then you're just sitting in a field, which is fine for
a couple hours, but polls are open about 15 hours a day." Jessica Huseman, So
Far, Trump's 'Army" of Poll Watchers Looks More Like a Small Platoon,
PRoPUBLICA (Nov. 2, 2020, 12:31 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/so-fartrumps-army-of-poll-watchers-looks-more-like-a- small-platoon.
246. Calls for ballot integrity "armies" occurred, for example, in both the
Gavin Newsom September 2021 recall election and in Virginia's November 2021
gubernatorial election. See, e.g., Paige St. John, Election Watchers Snap Photos
TIMEs (Sept. 10,
of Workers, Challenge Voter Signatures as Recall Nears, L.A.
2
2021, 12:38 PM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/ 021-09-10/election(describing the efforts of
chiefs-wary-of-california-recall-vote-fraud-claims
volunteers with the Election Integrity Project in California's recall); id.
("[E]lection workers arrive to pick up ballots from a county drop box outside of
Leisure World and, no matter what time of day they make their rounds, [they]
are invariably met by a man who pops out to take their picture. Other election
workers report individuals photographing their license plates."); Meagan Flynn
& Shawn Boburg, An Army of Poll Watchers - Many Driven by GOP's 'Election
Integrity' Push - Turns Out Across Virginia, WASH. PosT (Oct. 27, 2021, 3:54
https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2021/10/27/virginia-pollPM),
watchers-election/. Election integrity efforts aimed at proving fraud in the 2020
election have gone to voters' doorsteps. See, e.g., Sarah Mimms, The Pro-Trump
Conspiracy Internet Is Moving from Facebook to Your Doorstep, BuzzFEED
(December 14, 2021), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/sarahmimms/
election-fraud-conspiracy-groups-new-hampshire; Aaron Parseghian, Pro-Trump
Activists Going Door-to-Door with Hopes of Finding Voter Fraud in Michigan,
Fox 17 (Oct 13, 2021), https://www.foxl7online.com/news/politics/pro-trumpactivists-going-door-to-door-with-hopes-of-finding-voter-fraud-in-mchigan.
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from disruption-do not fully capture the range of harms election
surveillance can inflict. The next Subpart examines such harms and
state interests in addressing them.
C.

Election Surveillance Harms and State Interest

Courts have held that preventing voter intimidation and election
process disruption are compelling government interests that are
sturdy enough to survive strict scrutiny when it comes to
constitutionally limiting the right to record in polling places and
buffer zones surrounding them. 247 But when voters are out of the
picture (so to speak), what state interests apply? What is the state's
interest in, for example, prohibiting surveillance of election workers
in parking lots when no voter is in sight? 248 What is the state's
interest in prohibiting a credentialed observer of a recount from
holding up her cell phone to record what she is legally there to see if
doing so does not disrupt election processes or implicate ballot
secrecy? 249

The answer lies in understanding the precise nature of potential
harms. As noted above, the first harm these actions could bring about
has not crystallized until recently: election surveillance increasingly
targets election workers. Threatening and harassing surveillance of
election workers-at the polls, at election offices, and even at their
homes-is deeply worrisome; the country relies on this (most often
temporary) workforce for the wheels of democracy to turn. Election

247.
248.

Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 206 (1992).
It is possible that harassing election workers in parking lots is

constitutionally protected activity unless and until such behavior amounts to

"true threats." Daniel Tokaji, Dean of University of Wisconsin Law School, has
questioned whether ballot integrity activity constitutes a "true threat," noting
that the intimidation a target might feel from a ballot integrity effort might not
rise to the level of a true threat. Daniel P. Tokaji, True Threats: Voter
Intimidationand the Constitution, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE, HARBINGER
101, 107 (2015) ("Voter intimidation may sometimes involve violence, but not
always-as in the example of threats of criminal prosecution for voter fraud. It
is not at all clear whether threats of something other than violence fall within
the true threats doctrine. There is a strong argument that they should, given
that non-violent threats may discourage eligible citizens from voting as much as
threats of violence."). Dean Tokaji goes on to note that the leading Supreme
Court case, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), seems to limit its true threats
holding to those that involve violence. Id.
249. This raises interesting questions about technological capability. A cell
phone might not be able to capture writing on a ballot at a distance of several
feet. But technology exists that would allow such capture. See Samuel D. Hodge,
Jr., Big Brother Is Watching: Law Enforcement's Use of Digital Technology in the
Twenty-First Century, 89 U. CIN. L. REV. 30, 32-33 (2020) (describing video
technology that allowed the user to "visualize words on a page hundreds of feet
away"). Any rule covering election surveillance must take existing-and futuretechnological possibility into account.
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workers, the vast majority of whom are part-time, ordinary citizens
stepping up to perform a crucial public duty, have been the
250
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unfortunate targets of some of the worst surveillance abuses.
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degrading public confidence in elections. For this reason, courts must
take states' interests in protecting election workers from surveillance
seriously, even when doing so only indirectly implicates disruption of
the election process itself.
A second harm is also newly emerging. As we come to terms with
new ways in which modern information architectures threaten
democracy, election surveillance footage threatens to fuel mis- and
2 52
Swirling mis- and
disinformation about election administration.
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capturing
theory fires. 255 The use of images and recordings of election processes
250. Congressional Research Service, Election Worker Safety and Privacy
(December 21, 2021), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11831.
Multiple news outlets have reported on this phenomenon. See, e.g., Melissa Nann
Burke & George Hunter, 'I Feel Afraid': Detroit Clerk Winfrey Testifies to U.S.
House Panel on Death Threats She Received, DETROIT NEWS (July 28, 2021, 3:44
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2021/07/28/winfreyPM),
Zach
testifies-before-house-panel-threats-election-workers/5400419001/;
Montellaro, Local Election Officials are Exhausted, Under Threat, and Thinking
About Quitting, POLITICO (March 10, 2022, 5:01 AM), https://www.politico.com/
news/2022/03/10/election-officials-exhausted-under-threat-00015850.
251. Michael Wines, After a Nightmare Year, Election Officials Are Quitting,
N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/02/us/politics/2020election-voting-officials.html.
252. Misinformation is generally understood as false or out-of-context
information that is presented as fact, regardless of its intent to deceive. See
Misinformation,

MERRIAM-WEBSTER,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/

dictionary/misinformation (last visited April 11, 2022) ("[I]ncorrect or misleading
information."). Disinformation is a type of misinformation that is intentionally
See Disinformation, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
false and intended to deceive.
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/disinformation (last visited April
11, 2022) ("[F]alse information deliberately and often covertly spread (as by the
planting of rumors) in order to influence public opinion or obscure the truth.").
253. See discussion supra Subpart III.A (including commentary on confusion
over livestreamed, valid ballot duplication efforts feeding conspiracy theories
about election workers illegally marking ballots).
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by those with the intent to undermine the reliability of election
outcomes is a significant concern.
The need to ensure public
confidence in election outcomes should inform courts deciding election
surveillance cases, even when actions do not directly impact voters in
polling places.
The Supreme
Court has recognized the harm that
decontextualized and/or manipulated information can sow. Outside
the election context, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the
right of access can be distinguished from the right to distribute
recordings of what is observed to protect against that harm. In Nixon
v. Warner Communications, Inc., 254 media organizations sought
access to tape recordings of President Nixon in the Oval Office played
in open court. 25 5 Members of the press were provided full access to
the court proceeding in which the audio tapes were played aloud. The
court additionally provided the press with written transcripts of the
tapes. 256 But the press sought access to the recordings themselves so
the public could hear the sound of the president's voice on their
broadcasts.
In Nixon, the media alleged that "public
understanding ... remains incomplete in the absence of the ability to
listen to the tapes and form judgments as to their meaning based on
inflection and emphasis." 25 7
Respondent argued that enabling press access to rebroadcast the
full twenty-two hours of recordings could result in harmful distortion:
If made available for commercial recordings or broadcast by the
electronic media, only fractions of the tapes, necessarily taken
out of context, could or would be presented. Nor would there be
any safeguard, other than the taste of the marketing medium,
against distortion through cutting, erasing, and splicing of

tapes. There would be strong motivation to titillate as well as
to educate listeners. 258
Crediting this concern, the Supreme Court denied press access to
the recordings, concluding that, "[t]he [Sixth Amendment]
requirement of a public trial is satisfied by the opportunity of
members of the public and the press to attend the trial and to report
what they have observed." 25 9

254. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
255. Id. at 591.
256. Id. at 594.
257. Id. at 610.
258. Id. at 601.
259. Id. at 610. The Supreme Court has taken a similar stance with respect
to the Freedom of Information Act. Access is the default, but when the plaintiff
seeks access to government information in a particular format, the Supreme
Court is unmoved. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Just. v. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of
the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 780 (1989) (denying press access to digitized FBI rap

&

2022]

ELECTION SURVEILLANCE

339

Public access to court proceedings and records provides a close
analogy to public oversight of elections. Like public access to election
processes, a key reason why public access to court proceedings is vital
260
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constitutionally limited to protect the sanctity of the voting process
and public confidence in outcomes in the face of alarmingly fragile
public trust.
26 3
Concern about public confidence in outcomes is pressing.
Particularly after the events of January 6, 2021, the risks of election
sheets). Speaking with a group of law students, Justice Antonin Scalia was asked
why he stood against television cameras at the Supreme Court. He replied that
"[i]f he were convinced that people would watch from the start of an argument to
the end, then he would have no objection to cameras in the courtroom. But that
is not how the video would be used. Instead, only snippets of the argument would
be seen-only the most dramatic, or the most extreme-with the result
being . .. that there would be less understanding about what the Court did,
rather than more." Lawrence Lessig, Privacy and Attention Span, 89 GEo. L.J.
2063, 2063 (2001).
260. See LOGAN CORNETT & NATALIE ANNE KNOWLTON, INST. FOR THE
ADVANcEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., PUBLIC PERSPECTIVES ON TRUST
CONFIDENCE IN THE COURTS 3 (2020).

261. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 556 (1980)
(surveying legal indicia from the antecedent British system); id. ("[T]he King's
will was that all evil doers should be punished after their deserts, and that justice
should be ministered indifferently to rich as to poor; and for the better
accomplishingof this, he prayed the community of the county by their attendance
there to lend him their aid in the establishing of a happy and certain peace that
should be both for the honour of the realm and for their own welfare.").
262. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986)
(establishing a two-part test for whether government processes must be open
according to whether (1) the relevant proceedings historically have been open and
(2) the public access ensures the functioning of a governing process); Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 610 (1982) (stating that the press
and general public may be barred from the courtroom during the testimony of
minor sex victims but are not denied access to transcripts, court personnel, or

other resources that can provide an account of such testimony).
263. See generally YocHAI BENKLER ET AL., NETWORK PROPAGANDA:
MANIPULATION, DISINFORMATION, AND RADICALIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS

(2018) (describing the threat to democracy that mis- and disinformation pose);
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surveillance-fed damage to public confidence is far greater than the
possible late-night comedy butchering of Nixon's Oval Office rants.
The government interest in preventing the spread of mis- and
disinformation about election mechanics and reliability is not only
compelling but also arguably democratically existential. 264
The state's imperative to prevent voter intimidation, chilling of
electoral participation, disruption of election processes, an exodus of
election workers, and the undermining of public confidence in election
outcomes all weigh in favor of regulating election surveillance
carefully. Any such curbs must be targeted and narrowly tailored to
address specific harms while still enabling robust, meaningful public
oversight of elections to the fullest extent. The next Part posits
several suggestions for how this needle might be threaded.
VI. ELECTION SURVEILLANCE: A PATH FORWARD

Eleven years ago, when the Internet's existential threat to
democracy was but a glimmer, transparency researcher Archon Fung
wrote a book chapter called Popular Election Monitoring: How
Technology Can Enable Citizen Participation in Election
Administration.2 5 Starting with rosy examples of crowdsourced bird
research and Google Flu Trends, Professor Fung wondered: Could
crowdsourced surveillance be leveraged to improve elections? 26 6
Professor Fung argued that large-scale, technologically enhanced
public monitoring of elections had many potential benefits, including
providing real-time data that could help address polling place
problems as they happened; increasing civic engagement in the
election process; and enabling transparent data dissemination about
election administration that could be used to benchmark best
practices. 267
Professor Fung surmised that negative consequences could flow
as, well. He noted, for example, the potential unreliability of what
amounted to "citizen journalism," crediting this skepticism for a lack
of buy-in among some media outlets for early experiments in

Nathaniel Persily, The 2016 U.S. Election: Can Democracy Survive the Internet?,
28 J. DEMOCRACY 63 (2017) (exploring the effects of the internet and digital
campaigns on the 2016 election).
264. See Richard L. Hasen, Identifying and Minimizing the Risk of Election
Subversion and Stolen Elections in the Contemporary United States, 135 HARv.
L. REV. F. 265, 265-66 (2022) (arguing that laws prohibiting dissemination of
false information about election mechanics are constitutional).
265. See generally Archon Fung, Popular Election Monitoring, How
Technology Can Enable Citizen Participation in Election Administration, in
RACE, REFORM, AND REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 192 (Guy-Uriel E.

Charles, Heather K. Gerken, & Michael S. Kang eds., 2010).
266. Id. at 192-93.
267. Fung, supra note 265, at 193-94.
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Professor Fung offered solutions to this latter problem that are
instructive in thinking through election surveillance best practices.
First, Professor Fung suggested that allowing only trained monitors
272
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to participate would reduce noise and spoiling.
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Fung concluded
reformers: the best way to ensure public confidence in the orderly
administration of elections is the imposition of structure.
Building on these impulses, the following discussion first lays out
recommendations aimed at ensuring election surveillance improves
public confidence in elections and then suggests some of the
challenges these recommendations face.

268. See id. at 200-01 ("[D]oubts within [the news organization Professor
Fung partnered with, ABC News] about the reliability of crowd-sourced
information created a reluctance to promote the effort .... This divergence
indicates uncertainty on the part of professional journalists regarding the place
of this new, technologically enabled method in particular and of citizen
journalism more broadly.").
269. Id. at 201.
Such participation bias has been shown to create
270. Id. at 204.
discriminatory impacts. In the famed Boston pothole example, the City of Boston
created a mobile application called StreetBump, enabling city dwellers to
transform their phones into mobile pothole detectors. "The app transmitted data
directly to city government, which used the data to determine which areas of the
city most needed street repair." Gilman & Green, supranote 118, at 285. As it
turned out, "residents of the more affluent portions of the city were more likely
to install the app, thus distorting the true picture of need and exacerbating
already-enormous disparities in Boston street maintenance." Gilman & Green,
supra note 118, at 285. See also Kate Crawford, Think Again: Big Data: Why the
Rise of Machines Isn't All It's Cracked Up to Be, FOREIGN PoL'Y (May 10, 2013,
12:40 AM) http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/10/think-again-big-data/.
271. Fung, supra note 265, at 204.
272. Id. at 204-05.
273. Id. at 205.
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Election Surveillance Recommendations

During another era of great tumult in U.S. elections in the late
1800s, voting had become unruly. 2 74 Reformers reacted by instituting
the secret ballot, 275 by bringing election administration under state
control, 276 and by implementing structured transparency regimes in
which credentialed candidate and party observers served as the eyes
and ears of the public. 277
Answers today will involve finding ways in which the public can
be reassured that election processes contain adequate checks and
balances against malfeasance, that only eligible voters are casting
ballots, and that illegal activity does not corrupt election outcomes.
Failure to take action to address public confidence in elections results
in worrisome political movements like private partisan "audit" efforts
that threaten to further foment public distrust of elections. 278
The following discussion proposes several ideas to impose
structure on election surveillance in an effort to lessen its harms
while simultaneously strengthening its ability to increase public
confidence in elections. It offers three modest proposals that, working
in tandem, might move the ball forward or at least ignite thinking.
First, election surveillance should be carefully regulated. Second,
states should impose strict penalties for circulation of surveillance
material intentionally designed to falsely malign voters, election
officials, or the conduct of elections. And third, states should enhance
and expand official election surveillance mechanisms with built-in
protections against distortion.
1. Regulating Election Surveillance
Just as the justice system is open to public observation by default,
so too must be our system of elections. But free, open, and meaningful
access to all stages of the election process should not extend to the

274. See, e.g., RIcHARD P. MCCORMICK, THE HISTORY OF VOTING IN NEW JERSEY:
A STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTION MACHINERY 1664-1911, at 114 (1953)

(describing general drunkenness and debauchery at the polls); RICHARD
FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE AMERICAN BALLOT Box IN THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY

20 (2004) (same).
275. See Green, supra note 10, at 785-90 (describing how, over the course of
the nineteenth century, American elections administered by political parties
became increasingly
unruly and
maladministered,
prompting the
implementation of the secret ballot and the takeover of election administration
by state administrators).

276. Id.
277. See id; see also supranote 22 and accompanying text.
278. See JONATHAN BYDLAK ET AL., BRENNAN CTR., PARTISAN ELECTION REVIEW
EFFORTS IN FIVE STATES 5 (2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/

research-reports/partisan-election-review-efforts-five-states/ (documenting the
concerns regarding partisan election review efforts in Arizona, Pennsylvania,
Wisconsin, Michigan, and Georgia).
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right of observers to record what they see. Some states, as described
279
above, ban the use of recording equipment at polling places already.
Some states explicitly ban poll watchers from using recording
equipment. 280 Most state statutes, as noted, are silent on the
Proposed here are uniform restrictions on election
question.
surveillance, prohibiting recording at any location in which election
activities take place (e.g., not just polling places), and preventing poll
watchers or any member of the public from using a device to record
voters or election processes. Any prohibition of election surveillance
should do nothing to restrict meaningful and plentiful opportunities
for in-person observation of election processes before, during, and
after Election Day, but states should limit the use of devices to record
election activities and processes to prevent voter intimidation,
disruption, and distortion.
Election surveillance prohibitions should not be confined to
polling places. They should include areas through which voters
and/or election officials must travel to engage in election activity.
State voter intimidation statutes presage this enlarged scope by
explicitly including thoroughfares outside of polling places. An Iowa
statute, for example, prohibits intimidating a voter "while in or
approaching the polling place," making specific mention of ingress
and egress to include activity
during the receiving of ballots, either on the premises of a

polling place or within three hundred feet of an outside door of

a building affording access to a room where the polls are held,
or of an outside door of a building affording access to a hallway,
corridor, stairway, or other means of reaching the room where

the polls are held. 281

And
election
process.
workers
workers

finally, election surveillance prohibitions must protect
officials from harm in addition to voters and the voting
Congress has taken note of the urgency in protecting election
and is considering measures aimed at protecting election
282
Proposals
from threats, harassment, and interference.

279. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
281. IOWA CODE § 39A.4(1)(a)(1)-(2).
282. Numerous groups have called for federal legislation to protect election
workers from harassment and harm. See, for example, Letter from AmericanArab Anti-Discrimination Committee et al. to Members of Congress (Dec. 1,
https://www.lwv.org/sites/default/files/2021-12/Election-Subversion2021),
Letter.pdf, and see also Gowri Ramachandran, Congress Must Act to Protect
2021),
28,
(July
CENTER
BRENNAN
THE
Officials,
Election
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/congress-must-act-

protect-election-officials. Congress has taken notice; see, e.g., Linda So, New U.S.
Legislation Seeks to Expand Protectionsfor Election Workers, REUTERS (Oct. 21,
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recognize that confining protections against surveillance must extend
beyond polling places, and even election offices, to protect election
workers' privacy more generally. 283 States legislatures are taking
notice too.284 Failing to protect election workers at all stages of the
election process from surveillance tactics and harassment threatens
continued democratic functioning in this country. 2 85
2.

Penaltiesfor SpreadingElection Surveillance Disinformation

Curbs on election surveillance may not be enough. Doctored
images or decontextualized official election surveillance footage can
nevertheless be used to undermine public faith in elections. For this
reason, states should consider imposing penalties for circulating
doctored or misleading images or videos of election processes
intentionally designed to undermine public confidence in election
outcomes.

Professor Richard Hasen has carefully considered the problem of
policing lies in elections, concluding that the First Amendment is and

2021),
https://www.reuters.com/world/us/new-us-legislation-seeks-expandprotections-election-workers-2021-10-04/. Members of Congress have introduced
legislation aimed at protecting election workers. See, e.g., Election Worker and
Polling Place Protection Act, H.R. 6872, 117th Cong. (2022). The stalled Freedom
to Vote Act contained election worker protections as well. See Freedom to Vote
Act, S. 2747, 117th Cong. §§ 3101-3102 (2021) ("It shall be unlawful for any
person, whether acting under color of law or otherwise, to intimidate, threaten,
coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce an election worker .. . with
intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with such official while engaged in the
performance of official duties, or with intent to retaliate against such official on
account of the performance of official duties.").
283. The Preventing Election Subversion Act of 2021 would make it unlawful
to publicly disseminate restricted personal information of election workers and
their family members. See Preventing Election Subversion Act of 2021, S. 2155,
117th Cong. § 612 (2021).
284. See Matt Vasilogambros, States Want to Boost Protectionsfor Threatened
Local Election Officials, PEW (March 9, 2022), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/
research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2022/03/09/states-want-to-boostprotections-for-threatened-local-election-officials (describing proposed legislation
in ten states to protect election workers).
285. Election officials currently find themselves the targets of threats and
intimidation. Election watchdogs are taking note and providing guidance and
resources to help. See, e.g., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. & BIPARTISAN POL'Y CTR.,
ELECTION OFFICIALS UNDER ATTACK: How TO PROTECT ADMINISTRATORS AND
SAFEGUARD DEMOCRACY (2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/

files/2021-06/BCJ-129%20ElectionOfficials-v7.pdf.
In September 2021,
prominent election attorneys Bob Bauer (a Democrat) and Ben Ginsberg (a
Republican) founded the Election Official Legal Defense Network to provide pro
bono assistance to election workers to respond to the imposition of criminal
penalties for performing their professional duties and to threats of violence to
themselves and their families. See About, ELECTION OFF. LEGAL DEF. NETWORK,
https://eoldn.org/about (last visited Mar. 18, 2022).
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Statutes already on the books in many states prohibit certain
types of false statements in elections in narrow circumstances.
According to the National Conference of State Legislatures,
[t]wenty-seven states prohibit specific types of false statements,
most commonly false claims of incumbency; false claims about
candidate endorsements; or false statements about information

people need to be able to vote, such as the date of the

election . . .. Some states are not as specific, but do prohibit
false statements concerning an election, typically making it a
crime to knowingly or recklessly distribute false information
289
about a candidate or election.

Additionally, some state voter intimidation statutes restrict
Florida's voter
spreading falsehoods regarding voter eligibility.
intimidation statute, for example, imposes criminal liability for the
290
use of false information to challenge or prevent voting.
Aside from prohibiting false statements, many states discourage
misreporting on the part of election observers by requiring those
lodging claims against voters or election officials to do so in writing
and under oath. In New Hampshire, for example, an election observer
may challenge the eligibility of a voter only via a signed affidavit
291
submitted after taking an oath administered by an election official.
A Maine statute likewise strictly limits challenges:
286. Richard L. Hasen, A Constitutional Right to Lie in Campaigns and
Elections?, 74 MONT. L. REV. 53, 77 (2013) ("[T]he state may no longer have the
power to ban or punish malicious false campaign speech, whether made by
candidates or others.").
287. Id. at 57 ("[C]ourts should reject challenges to narrower laws that, under
an actual malice/clear and convincing evidence standard ... bar false (though not
misleading) election speech about the mechanics of voting, such as false
statements about the date and time of voting .... ").
288. To use an example Professor Hasen suggests, see RICHARD L. HASEN,
VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT ELECTION MELTDOWN 78 (2012).

289. Mark Listes & Wendy Underhill, Reducing Lies in Elections, NAT'L CONF.

OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 2014), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-

campaigns/reducing-lies-in-elections.aspx.
290. FLA. STAT. §§ 104.0615(3)-(4) (2021).
291. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659:27-a ("No challenge may be asserted except
in the form of a signed affidavit, under oath administered by an election
official .... ").
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The challenge must be made to the warden. The challenger
must state in the form of a signed affidavit setting forth, under
oath administered by the warden, the challenger's name,
address, party affiliation, status as a registered voter in the

municipality, the name of the voter challenged, the reason the
particular individual being challenged may be ineligible to vote,

the specific source of the information or personal knowledge

upon which the challenge of the particular individual is based

and a statement that the challenger understands that making
a false statement on the affidavit is punishable under penalties
of perjury. 292

These provisions exist for a reason. They are geared to enable
those with concerns about what they are observing to voice them, but
they require challengers to verify the accuracy of their reporting and
formally stand by their accusations. 293 The impulse behind such
statutes is clear and narrowly targeted: to discourage false reporting,
to prevent intimidation of voters, and to counteract intentional, false,
and malicious undermining of public faith in elections and election
outcomes. Just as perjury laws during trials seek to stop falsehoods
from staining our system of justice, so too should election codes work
292. ME. STAT. tit. 21-A § 673 (2021); see also Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 212-230(a)-(b) (2021) ("Any elector of the county or municipality may challenge the
right of any other elector of the county or municipality, whose name appears on
the list of electors, to vote in an election. Such challenge shall be in writing and
specify distinctly the grounds of such challenge ....
Upon the filing of such
challenge, the board of registrars shall immediately consider such challenge and
determine whether probable cause exists to sustain such challenge."); Hawaii,
HAw. REV. STAT. § 11-25(a) (2021) ("Any registered voter may challenge the right
of a person to be or to remain registered as a voter for any cause not previously
decided by the board of registration or the supreme court in respect to the same
person. The challenge shall be in writing, setting forth the grounds upon which
it is based, and be signed by the person making the challenge. The challenge
shall be delivered to the clerk who shall immediately serve notice thereof on the
person challenged. The clerk shall, as soon as possible, investigate and rule on
the challenge."); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659:27-a (2022) ("No
challenge may be asserted except in the form of a signed affidavit, under oath
administered by an election official, in the following form . ... ").
293. Regarding channeling complaints effectively in the elections context, the
Help America Vote Act, ("HAVA") mandates that each state create a formal
complaint process. See 52 U.S.C. § 20901. Virginia has developed a particularly
sophisticated reporting platform that generates useful and usable data on
complaints and problems during elections for use in improving elections going
forward. Such programs play an important role in improving public confidence
in elections through responsive election management. Virginia's Department of
Elections takes the extra step of compiling complaint information to ensure an
educated public. See VA. DEP'T OF ELECTIONS, NOVEMBER 3, 2020 POST-ELECTION
REPORT
(2021),
https://www.elections.virginia.gov/media/formswarehouse/

maintenance-reports/PostElectionReportFinalRevised_211001.pdf
(containing
detailed information about the nature and location of complaints filed concerning
the 2020 election).
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to prevent false and malicious uses of election surveillance from
undermining what is precious and precarious in a democracy: public
faith in elections. 294
One problem with applying this prohibition to circulation of
photographs and recordings of election processes, of course, is that it
might capture earnest attempts to alert the public to instances of
election malfeasance. If a poll watcher is witnessing, for example, an
election official engaged in blatantly illegal activity, the poll watcher's
photographic or video evidence of that malfeasance could helpfully
document it. Another clear challenge is innocent circulation: someone
sharing misleading images of election processes may fully believe
(mistakenly) that an election worker or a voter is breaking the law.
The solution to this conundrum is not to allow rampant co- and
sousveillance of elections, sifting through what is captured and
circulated for intentionally doctored or misleading images and video
only after the damage to public confidence in outcomes is done. It is
instead, again, to take steps to limit image capture up front; to ensure
expansive opportunities for meaningful in-person observation at
every stage of the election process; and to publicize clear rules for how
watchers and members of the public can report observed election
irregularities directly to election officials in a position to address
concerns at the scene. Part of the solution is also expanded and
extensive official election surveillance, as described next.
Expanding Official Election Surveillance
If election sous- and coveillance is curtailed, an important
counterbalance is thoughtful expansion of official election
As noted above, many state statutes
surveillance mechanisms.
29
mandate official surveillance of certain election processes. 5 Such
policies should be expanded with careful consideration to ensuring
that official surveillance does not operate to intimidate voters or
3.

294. Congress is considering legislation that would prohibit the circulation of
knowingly false information about the time, place, or manner of an election. See
Freedom to Vote Act, S. 2747, 117th Cong. § 3202(a) (2021) ("No person, whether
acting under color of law or otherwise, shall, within 60 days before an election
described ... by any means, including by means of written, electronic, or
telephonic communications, communicate or cause to be communicated . .. or
produce information [regarding the time, place, or manner of holding any
election] . . . with the intent that such information be communicated, if such
person-(i) knows such information to be materially false; and (ii) has the intent
to impede or prevent another person from exercising the right to vote in an
election described .... "). Even if circulating knowingly false video of an election
process with the intent of undermining public confidence in elections fell under
the "manner" category in this proposed rule, the provision appears to relate only
to false information that would deter voters (like "the election has been moved to
Wednesday" as opposed to general efforts to discredit elections).
295. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (describing existing statemandated official election surveillance requirements).
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compromise ballot secrecy. To the extent financially and practically
feasible, states should consider recording all election processes,
ideally from multiple angles. 296
Such recordings need not be
broadcast or indeed ever see the light of day, but should rather be
preserved as evidence for use if allegations of misconduct arise. 2 97
States should also consider expanding opportunities for remote
observation of certain election processes where voter privacy and
ballot secrecy are not at issue, such as ballot tabulation or recounts.
If a state elects to offer remote observation, however, it should be done
mindfully. The Council of State Governments ("CSG") recommends
that when election officials enable remote observation streamed
online, those who wish to watch be required "to provide their name,
address, and other information and to accept conditions/guidelines for
remote observation." 298 CSG points to one such process used in
Orange County, California. 299
This is a form of structured
transparency configured for the digital age. A variation of this idea
would be to record everything and livestream it but only allow it to be
viewed by those who have completed training on the law and practices
of the relevant election processes. This would enable such knighted
remote observers to both report problems in real time and transmit
assurances to candidates, parties, and the public.39 9
Finally, careful thought should be given to improving public
confidence in "disembodied" portions of the election process.
Surveillance studies scholars have examined how in our increasingly
disembodied, digitized world, surveillance techniques have emerged
296. Continual surveillance feeds are of course the norm in numerous private
and public spaces. The benefits and drawbacks of continual surveillance is the
subject of a whole vein of surveillance scholarship. See, e.g., BILGE YESIL, VIDEO
SURVEILLANCE: POWER AND PRIVACY IN EVERYDAY LIFE (2009); ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE STUDIES (Kirstie Ball, Kevin D. Haggerty & David

Lyon eds., 2012). For an interesting and related take on continual recording, see
Anita L. Allen, Dredgingup the Past: Lifelogging, Memory, and Surveillance, 75
U. CHLI. L. REV. 47 (2008) (discussing technologies that allow for continual
recording of life events and the benefits and costs of such technologies).
297. This idea draws on the same principles underpinning the impulse behind
paper ballots and other means of verifying the voting process. Andrew W. Appel
& Philip B. Stark, Evidence-Based Elections: Create a Meaningful Paper Trail,
Then Audit, 4 GEo. L. TECH. REV. 523, 526 (2020) ("[B]ecause of the widespread
recognition of this fatal flaw, only a handful of states use paperless [directrecording electronic, ('DRE'),] voting machines, and many of those states are
transitioning to technologies that have a paper trail starting from the individual
voter's ballot.").
298. Katyovi, Election 2020 in Review: Poll Watchers, Observersand the Ballot
Duplication Process, THE

COUNCIL

OF

STATE

GOV'TS

(Mar.

30,

2021),

https://ovi.csg.org/election-2020-in-review-remote-observation/.
299. See id.; see also Remote Election Observer Application, ORANGE CNTY.
REGISTRAR OF VOTERS, https://oevote.com/form/observer-request#no-back (last
visited Mar. 18, 2022).
300. See, e.g., Katyovi, supra note 298.
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In the elections space, official election surveillance strategies
thoughtfully deployed can help to repair the trust gap that is
widening. When voters cast paper ballots in person and those ballots
were counted by hand, election observers could effectively satisfy
themselves in the fairness of the process by being present and
As election processes have become increasingly
watching.
disembodied, as evidenced by, for example, increasing numbers of
voters casting votes by absentee ballot (a trend that started well
before 2020), opportunities to meaningfully watch the voting process
have diminished.3 03 Those who design election processes should take
steps to account for trust gaps that disembodied election processes
give rise to and examine ways official election surveillance
mechanisms (and other devices like risk-limiting audits) might be
leveraged to fill those gaps.

B.

Drawbacks/Difficulties

The proposals forwarded here---curtailing election sous- and
coveillance, imposing penalties for malicious circulation of election
surveillance designed to undermine public confidence in elections;
and increasing official election surveillance mechanisms-come with
costs.
First, denying people the right to record what they are legally
allowed to see risks creating a perception that election administrators
have something to hide. This is why prohibiting the use of recording
devices must be accompanied by policies that allow and encourage
meaningful public access for credentialed and trained observers and
304
by expanded official election surveillance.
Second, prohibitions on the right to record during elections are
certain to face uphill battles on First Amendment grounds, especially
the further election surveillance prohibitions stray from polling
305
places. Elections are quintessentially matters of public concern.
Despite precedent noted above and the constitutionality of recording
bans in polling places, it may be difficult to convince a judge that
protecting election workers from harassment and/or preventing
301. LYON, supranote 21, at 8 (discussing how, in the modern era, intervening
interfaces supplant face-to-face interaction such that "bodies are disappearing").
302. Id. at 125.
303. See Green, supra note 14, at 468-71.
304. Id. at 484-85 (discussing the importance of meaningful access for
election observers).
305. Skinner-Thompson, supra note 215, at 138, 173 (citing Fields v. City of
Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 360 (3d Cir. 2017) (suggesting that the right to record
should be limited to public locations, to matters of public concern, or to situations
involving an intent to distribute)).
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intentional disinformation and distortion warrants curtailing First
Amendment freedoms when voter intimidation and election
disruption are not as directly in play. It may unfortunately take more
time for these harms to manifest in judicially cognizable ways.
And finally, it is important to acknowledge that those determined
to undermine public confidence in U.S. elections have a bottomless pit
of options and multiple ways to hide their identity and/or subvert
detection.30 6 Curtailing election surveillance does not remove the
possibility of mischief.
Anonymous recordings will continue to
circulate. And official election surveillance footage can easily be
manipulated and decontextualized by malicious actors. Even if a
jurisdiction succeeds in prohibiting nonofficial election surveillance
going forward, footage from previous elections can be used to
implicate current election malfeasance or be manipulated to make
what did not happen appear to have happened. 307 The hope that
prohibitions can prevent dissemination of nefarious election
surveillance content confronts a reality in which anonymous actors
(foreign and domestic) routinely engage in criminal activity online
with abandon.
These hurdles are significant. The proposals suggested here
provide only a starting point for thinking about the role of election
surveillance in promoting public confidence in U.S. elections. The
time to carefully consider election surveillance policies is now.
CONCLUSION

The comparison between allowing members of the public to
observe elections and judicial proceedings is a good one. In both cases,
a functioning and just democracy depends on the ability of members
of the public to see and verify the integrity of both judicial and
electoral processes. To secure public trust, the judicial system relies
on full and open public access for anyone and everyone to see
firsthand that justice is done.30 8 Likewise, transparent elections that
allow meaningful access to observers of all political stripes must
continue to lie at the core of state election administration. But for the
same reason that federal courts prohibit cell phones and jurors are
not equipped with body cameras, elections require curbs on
surveillance to preserve decorum, defend the civil liberties of voters,

306. See Citron & Chesney, supra note 77, at 1792 (describing the attribution
problem in online crimes).
307. See id. at 1777-78 (describing the challenges deep fakes present to
democratic functioning); see also Green, supra note 77, at 1451 (describing the
threat deep fakes in elections and arguing that counterfeit candidate speech can
be constitutionally prohibited).
308. Judiciary Takes Action to Ensure High Ethical Standards and
Transparency, U.S. CTs. (Oct. 26, 2021), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2021/
10/ 2 6 /judiciary-takes-action-ensure-high-ethical-standards-and-transparency.
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protect election workers, and preserve public confidence in the careful
work of state election administrators to run fair elections.

